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The dissertation has three main chapters on product quality innova-
tion. First, we compare innovation effort and social welfare between monopoly,
duopoly, and the social planner in a dynamic model with quality dependent
on a continuous know-how stock. The technology frontier–the largest reach-
able know-how stocks–does not always positively depend on competitiveness,
i.e. a duopoly may technologically surpass the social planner. However, social
welfare is always positively tied to competitiveness. Second, with a general
equilibrium model, we derive a relative price function expressing productivity
and quality effects, and develop a method for inferring relative quality changes.
An application to services versus goods of the US from 1946-2006 provides evi-
dence on aggregate quality changes and suggests us to incorporate quality vari-
ations when explaining relative prices. Third, we build a two-product model
where productivity changes lead to reallocations of labor between quantity pro-
duction and quality innovation. The correlation between relative productivity
and relative quality is negative for low-range substitutability and positive for
medium-range substitutability between the two products. Looking at services
versus goods of the US, the correlation is negative and productivity-driven
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As consumers, we get more utility from larger quantities and better
quality of goods and services. In the current dissertation, if a is the quantity
and α is the quality of some product, the effective quantity of consumption
is c = α × a. In this specification, if either quantity or quality is zero, we
consume nothing. For example, human beings cannot survive for an extended
period of time just by drinking pure water. We will cover three models on
quality innovation (changes in α) where the distinction between quantity and
quality matters. Respectively, we need the distinction when: (i) firms compete
to gain customers with better quality; (ii) we want to explain some relative
price data; and (iii) the economy as a whole needs to find the best labor reallo-
cation between quantity production and quality innovation when productivity
changes. The rest of the dissertation is structured as follows.
Chapter 2 considers the effects of market structure on quality innova-
tion effort and social welfare. We compare three allocation mechanisms in
a model of dynamic quality innovation: monopoly, duopoly, and the social
planner. The new feature in this model relative to the technological progress
literature is to make quality advances depend upon a continuous know-how
stock. In contrast to the previous models, this framework allows for more flex-
ible innovation strategies and direct comparisons of technology frontiers which
show the largest reachable know-how stocks. The chapter relies on analytical
and computational approaches to compare technology frontiers and social wel-
fare under the different allocation mechanisms. When products are perfectly
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substitutable, the technology frontier is highest under the social planner, lower
under duopoly, and lowest under monopoly. However, when products are less
substitutable, a duopoly may surpass the technology frontier under the social
planner. Ex ante and long-run social welfare are always highest under the
social planner and lowest under monopoly.
Chapter 3 develops a simple general equilibrium model to infer relative
quality changes at the aggregate level and applies the inference method to
the goods and services sectors of the United States from 1946 to 2006. The
data are from the US National Income and Product Accounts. The existing
empirical quality literature embraces the idea that price information alone can
be used to track quality changes. However, prices are also driven by other
forces, especially quantities supplied to markets. In solving this identifica-
tion problem, the general equilibrium model generates an equilibrium relative
price function which can be decomposed into productivity and quality effects.
A method for inferring relative quality changes using aggregate data is then
derived from this decomposition. In applying this method, the chapter finds
first that the quality of US services relative to US goods was decreasing after
1946 and has been increasing since the 1970s. Second, in the services sector,
productivity and quality, relative to the goods sector, are negatively corre-
lated, suggesting an endogenous link between the two. Third, without quality
variations, productivity changes alone cannot fully explain the evolution of the
relative price of services. This suggests that ignoring quality variations when
explaining relative prices can lead to incorrect conclusions. Being quite simple,
the quality inference method can also be applied to many other countries.
Chapter 4 considers a fixed set of two products whose quality varies in
response to changes in productivity (productivity-driven quality) in the con-
text of competitive growth and business-cycle models. The growth model is
then fitted to US data and generates a time path of relative quality changes
2
which are hypothetically subject only to productivity variations. The chapter
addresses two questions: First, how does productivity affect quality? Second,
in the United States, how important is productivity-driven quality in total
quality, where the latter varies due to all possible sources like randomly de-
veloped ideas for quality improvement as well as productivity? In this model,
labor is used for both quantity production and quality innovation. As quan-
tity and quality can be substitutable, a change in productivity will induce a
reallocation of labor, leading to quality variations. Thus, differing from the
variety-growth and quality-ladder literature, the chapter does not use market
power to explain why quality varies. Theoretically, we find that the corre-
lation between (relative) productivity and (relative) quality depends on two
key parameters, which govern how substitutable the products are (substitu-
tion parameter) and how easy it is to improve quality (innovation parameter).
Specifically, productivity and quality have a negative correlation for low-range
substitutability and a positive correlation for medium-range substitutability,
where the upper bound of the medium range negatively depends on the innova-
tion parameter. The model is then applied to the US services-goods economy
from 1970 to 2006 using aggregate data from the US National Income and
Product Accounts. The parameter estimates imply a negative correlation be-
tween productivity and quality. In addition, productivity-driven quality can
play a significant role in total quality.
3
Chapter 2
Competitiveness and Quality Innovation
2.1 Introduction
Intel and AMD are racing against each other to improve the speed of
Pentium and Athlon micro processors, respectively. Even though Pentium and
Athlon more or less do the same thing, they have their own patent protection.
Quality innovation in the form of higher computational speeds is a clear ex-
ample of technological progress. Between the two, the faster processor pleases
consumers more, having supremacy over its competitor. We can find similar
instances with a small number of dominant firms who repeatedly improve their
product quality in the commercial jet market, the cellular phone market, etc.
Without races, technology may not progress as fast as observed. How-
ever, quality improvements often come at huge Research and Development
(R&D) costs, and races may lead to wasteful investments. This raises the
question: how does market structure affect quality innovation efforts and so-
cial welfare? We will consider three allocation mechanisms in a model of
dynamic quality innovation: monopoly, duopoly, and the social planner. In
this model, firms spend on R&D to have superior blueprints (know-how) ac-
cording to which new and better product generations are produced. In this
sense of technological progress, know-how stocks do not depreciate, and in-
novation steps can be continuous. Innovation efforts mean both how much
firms spend on R&D and how much know-how they will accumulate. We are
interested in both ex ante discounted life-time and maximal long-run social
welfare. The terms maximal and frontier equivalently mean the know-how
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boundary beyond which firms no longer innovate.
We are addressing an important and interesting question. First, it is
widely believed that technological progress is important for improving quality
of life. Thus, understanding the innovation behaviors of different allocation
mechanisms helps us design policies for better outcomes. Second, answers to
different aspects of this question are not obvious at the face value. For example,
if product quality never depreciates, does a monopoly have an incentive to
innovate at all, as it does not face any competition? Do races for supremacy
improve social welfare as the speed of quality innovation accelerates, whereas
more resources are spent on R&D rather than on consumption? Without
quality depreciation, do we always see a duopoly market dominated by one
firm and the laggard never catch up with the front-runner? Third, as firms
can choose continuous steps to progress, how does the innovation dynamics of
different market structures, especially that of the duopoly, look like?
There are some highlights about the methodology. First, know-how
stocks, or alternatively quality levels, constitute the state in the model. As
mentioned above, this state is endogenously driven and non-decreasing. For
tractability, we assume there is a threshold of know-how stock beyond which no
firms can raise quality. Second, firms can choose continuous steps rather than
discrete ones to push up quality, and they face uncertainty in realizing those
steps. The introduction of continuous innovation steps allows for continuous
price ratios and enriches R&D competition strategies in the duopoly. Third,
behavior of the duopoly relies on some equilibrium concepts. Every period,
firms engage in price competition or a Bertrand game. In addition, they base
their R&D efforts on the state, and interact according to the pure-strategy
first-order Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE). Fourth, the dynamic game
setup does not support analytical solutions, and needs to rely on numerical
characterizations. The threshold assumption helps us know the solution far
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into the future. Based on this knowledge, a backward-induction numerical
algorithm is developed to solve the dynamic game. Fifth, to facilitate welfare
analyses, consumer utility is quasi-linear, absorbing firms’ profits.
Here are the main findings. First, when products are perfectly substi-
tutable, the technology frontier is highest under the social planner, lower under
duopoly, and lowest under monopoly. In addition, in a not-too-old duopoly,
innovation investments are intensified when firms are neck-and-neck and allevi-
ated when firms are far apart. Second, when products are less substitutable, a
duopoly may follow an unbalanced evolution path and surpass the technology
frontier under the social planner. Third, ex ante and long-run social welfare
are highest under the social planner and lowest under monopoly.
The vast game-theoretic R&D literature related to this study can be
divided into three overlapping groups of representative studies: (i) patent races
with Scherer (1967), Loury (1979), Dasgupta & Stiglitz (1980), Lee & Wilde
(1980), Harris & Vickers (1985, 1987), Reinganum (1981, 1982), Grossman &
Shapiro (1987), Lippman & McCardle (1987), Klette & Griliches (2000), and
Doraszelski (2003); (ii) technology ladder with Griliches (1979), Segerstrom
et al. (1990), Aghion & Howitt (1992), Grossman & Helpman (1991), and
Aghion et al. (2001); and (iii) MPE industry dynamics with Pakes & McGuire
(1994, 2001), Ericson & Pakes (1995), and Doraszelski & Markovich (2007).
The current study deviates from those groups in several aspects. First,
while the patent races set fixed prizes for R&D races, our model explicitly
specifies profits as product market outcomes, and quality innovation is repeat-
edly driven by the desire for more and sustainable profits. Second, technology
ladders are often in the form of quality ladders on which the front-runner and
many laggards are one step apart. Effectively, competitors only choose the
probability to progress one step. In our model, a laggard may choose a large
step and surpass the front-runner in the next period if the R&D project suc-
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ceeds. Aghion et al. (2001) allow competitors to be a number of steps apart.
However, the laggard has to catch up with the front-runner before fighting for
future leadership. In addition, they model a race down the production cost
ladder which is naturally bounded from below by zero and has downward price
effects. Our setup implies that quality innovation can bring about both larger
market shares and higher prices. Third, the current MPE industry dynam-
ics models allow net-state variables to move (exogenously) backward as well
as (endogenously) forward, and eventually cycle in an ergodic set. Concep-
tually, no firm will dominate forever. In addition, without entry and exit, a
laggard may catch up some day with only a little effort. Our model has a
non-decreasing state and allows for the possibility of permanent dominance.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 lays out the
primitives of the environment. Section 2.3 describes innovation behaviors and
welfare properties of the three allocation mechanisms. Section 2.4 characterizes
the dynamic results with numerical exercises. For simplicity, sections 2.3 and
2.4 focus on the linear substitution case. Non-linear substitution is considered
in Section 2.5 with the intuition carried from the previous analyses. Section
2.6 discusses some modeling issues. Finally, Section 2.7 concludes with some
remarks.
2.2 Environment
This is an economy of discrete infinite-time horizon. In this environ-
ment, two firms X and Y can technically improve quality of their correspond-
ing products x and y to serve a unit measure of identical consumers. Besides
x and y, there is another product z acting as the numeraire.
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2.2.1 Consumers
In each period, consumers are endowed with B units of the numeraire
z. As all of the products are perishable, consumers make static decisions to
maximize the one-period utility
max
x,y,z≥0
{u [(θxx)α + (θyy)α] + z} , α ∈ (0, 1]
s.t. pxx+ pyy + z = B, (2.1)
where x, y, z are quantities of consumption; θx and θy are quality indices ; α
is the substitution parameter; and u is a strictly concave function, specifically
it takes the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) form with rR = σ ∈ [12 , 1).
There are several highlighted features. First, as α ranges from above 0 to 1,
products x and y become increasingly closer substitutes. Second, the concavity
of function u(·) is necessary to accommodate the linear substitution case in
which α = 1. The reason why u(·) takes this CRRA class is to produce
unambiguous effects and will be explained later. Third, budget B is assumed
to be large enough so that z > 0 always holds in equilibrium. This condition
guarantees that a monopoly firm will never charge an infinite price. Fourth, in
this specification, the effective consumption quantity is the product of physical
quantity and the corresponding quality. In addition, quality is also subject to
the law of diminishing marginal utilities.
As consumers maximize their utility every period without any intertem-
poral choice, they will effectively have the maximized life-time utility. The
discount factor is β ∈ (0, 1), which is also the discount factor for firms.
2.2.2 Firms
Production has two dimensions: quality and quantity, which will be
specified in the corresponding order. First, firms X and Y are respectively
characterized by the know-how stocks kx and ky. A larger know-how stock
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embodied in a superior blueprint bears the notion of technological progress. A
know-how stock ki for i ∈ {x, y} is related to its corresponding quality index
θi by a common valuation function θ(·). Specifically θi = θ(ki) where θ(0) = 1,
θ′(·) ≥ 0, θ′′(·) ≤ 0, and limki→∞ θ′(ki) = 0. A specific valuation function is
illustrated by Figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1: Valuation function θ(ki)
In words, with a larger know-how stock, a firm can produce a new
product generation which is more appreciated by consumers. For simplicity, we
assume that there is a threshold know-how stock k∗ beyond which consumers
do not see a difference in quality, i.e. θ(ki) = θ
∗ ∀ki ≥ k∗.
Product supremacy is tied to the ordering of θx and θy, e.g. firm X has
the supremacy if θx > θy, or equivalently kx > ky for kx, ky < k
∗. Firms can
spend on R&D to accumulate more know-how. Let λi ∈ [0, 1] be the choice
variable for i ∈ {x, y}. The evolution function of a know-how stock is
k′i =
[
ki + s (λi) with probability λi
ki with probability 1− λi,
(2.2)
where (′) reads as next period only for state variables; λi ∈ [0, 1] is the chosen
investment intensity or success rate; and s(·) is the innovation step function
with s(0) = 0, s′(λi) > 0, and s
′′(λi) ≤ 0. As s(·) is continuous and defined
on [0, 1], it is bounded from above by the constant s = s(1). It is costly
to carry out R&D projects. Let c(λi) be the innovation cost function where
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c : [0, 1] −→ [0,∞), c′(·) ≥ 0, c′′(·) > 0, i.e. it is too costly to have success
for sure. It is noted that the linear accumulation technology in (2.2) does
not change over time, while the curvature of θ(·) does vary and will govern
investment behaviors. Thus, to support the notion of a fixed technological
structure, firms are not modeled to directly choose their quality indices.
Different from the quality ladder, a continuous step function implies
continuous quality indices and equilibrium price ratios, which significantly
enrich the set of competition strategies. Potentially, step and success rate
can be modeled as separate choices. However, to keep the model and its
computation tractable, the step is assumed to be a positive function of the
success rate. In other words, firms decide on how far they want to progress
next period and their efforts are subject to some uncertainty. Effectively, the
expected innovation step is an increasing function of the R&D effort which is
normalized to live in [0, 1]. In addition, we restrict s(·) so that the expected
step is convex in effort (Appendix A.1).
Finally, firms face no capacity constraints. In addition, it costs w units
of the numeraire to produce one unit of either x or y. Unit cost w does
not depend on the know-how stocks. Consequently, it is optimal for firms to
produce with the most superior blueprint, i.e. at the highest quality level.
2.2.3 Timing and Equilibrium Concepts
Later analyses will deal with investment performance and welfare prop-
erties of a monopoly, a duopoly, and the social planner. The monopoly and
social planner can control all activities of both firms. These three considera-
tions share a general timing as follows.
First, at the beginning of each period, all agents observe quality levels.
Second, firms decide on prices and the associated non-negative production
volumes. In the duopoly case, firms compete in prices, i.e. they engage in a
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Bertrand game. It is assumed that production and purchase take very small
amount of time. Consequently, firms pay all factor costs at the beginning of
the period after they collect revenue from consumers. Third, right after the
revenue collections and productive factor payments, firms decide on a non-
negative investment intensity for potential R&D projects. Firms can finance
R&D expenses from their profits or borrowings. Assume that firms can borrow
up to the amount they want at the market interest rate r = 1/β− 1, and they
borrow only for investments. In addition, principal and interest payments are
enforced so that if a firm does not pay back it will suffer some money-equivalent
punishment. For example, if the firm borrows c to pay for R&D activities, the
discounted future payments count −c to the present value. These assumptions
mean that there are no differences between self-financing and borrowing, and
firms have no effective budget constraints. An investment of c > 0 is desirable
only if the expected present value of future gains is strictly greater than c. If
a firm decides to invest, it will choose the optimal intensity to maximize the
β-discounted sum of profit flows. In the duopoly setting, firms follow some
simultaneous Markovian strategies. Finally, the outcome of any R&D project
is realized at the beginning of the next period, either a success or a failure.
In this setup, innovation investments depend on know-how stocks or
quality levels–the state, and pricing does not affect the evolution of the state.
Thus, price decisions (static) do not affect investment strategies (dynamic).
2.3 Linear Substitution and Behaviors
For expositional simplicity, especially when dealing with welfare, we
take linear substitution, i.e. α = 1, as the base case and carry out necessary
analyses in this section and the next one. As products are linearly substituted,
it is later shown that generically only one product, either x or y, is produced
and consumed every period. Simultaneous consumption only occurs when x
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and y have the same quality levels under duopoly. In Section 2.5, we will look
at the non-linear substitution case where α ∈ (0, 1).
2.3.1 Utility Maximization
With a quasi-linear preference, consumers maximize their utility by
first choosing the budget share b = B − z and then spend this amount on
products x and y. Given that money is optimally spent on x and y, b is chosen
at the point where its marginal utility is one.
Let’s look at how consumers divide b between the two competing prod-
ucts. Given prices, consumers solve the following sub-problem
max
x,y≥0
u(θxx+ θyy) s.t. pxx+ pyy = b. (2.3)
Define px/θx and py/θy as quality-adjusted prices (QAP). In this linear substi-
tution case, consumers only buy from the firm who offers a lower QAP. When
the two QAPs are equal, we assume that consumers demand x = y. Details
of these two cases are as follows.
First, if only product x is consumed (without loss of generality) and
hence x = b/px, b ∈ (0, B) is chosen to maximize u(θxb/px) + B − b with the
first-order condition (FOC) (θx/px)u
′(θxb
∗/px) = 1. The optimal allocation is
{x∗, y∗, z∗} = {b∗/px, 0, B − b∗}. (2.4)
Second, if px/θx = py/θy = (px+py)/(θx+θy), by the above assumption,
x = y = b/(px + py). The budget share b is chosen to maximize u((θx +
θy)b/(px + py)) + B − b, or equivalently u(θxb/px) + B − b. The FOC is the
same as in the first case. Let b∗∗ be the solution, the desirable consumption
bundle is
{x∗∗, y∗∗, z∗∗} = {b∗∗/ (px + py) , b∗∗/ (px + py) , B − b∗∗}. (2.5)
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Proposition 2.3.1. With the assumptions on consumer utility, in the two
previous cases, b(θx, px) increases in θx (and hence kx) and decreases in px. In
other words, consumers spend more on the innovation products if either quality
is higher or price is lower, and vice versa. Explicitly, b(θx, px) = (θx/px)
(1−σ)/σ.
Proof. This is an application of the implicit function theorem, based on initial
assumptions of the utility function (Appendix A.2).
In the following analyses, this consumption behavior will be taken into
account by the agents in different market structures. There is a general ob-
servation that, as unit costs are independent of quality, agents only consider
producing products with their latest generations.
2.3.2 Monopoly Pricing and Investment
The monopoly effectively controls two firms and form a perfect cartel, as
like that in Ericson & Pakes (1995). Starting with a zero know-how stock and a
normalized quality indices {1, 1}, a monopoly maximizes its discounted infinite
life-time profit by deciding on pricing and R&D investment every period.
Static Pricing. The first observation is that, in every period, the
monopoly only produces and sells one product. Proposition 2.3.1 shows that
revenue is increasing in quality. In addition, unit costs of x and y are the
same. Thus, the monopoly only commercializes either the product with quality
supremacy, or assumably x in the case of equal quality levels. Assume now
that x is the chosen product as its quality is at least as high as that of y. The











The first term is a decreasing function of price, while the second is increasing
in price. In fact, the profit maximization problem is well defined (Appendix
13





Next, the monopoly one-period profit function takes the closed form






It is noted that the price function does not depend on quality, which comes
from the quasi-linear form. Whereas, the profit function is increasing in θk or
kx. In addition, for σ ≥ 1/2, it is straightforward to show that the first-order
derivative ΠM1 (kx) is decreasing in kx. Thus the profit function Π
M (kx) is
concave in kx.
Dynamic Investment. The second observation is that the monopoly
wants to innovate only one product line, without loss of generality x, from the
beginning. As noted earlier, the R&D technology, i.e. innovation step and
cost functions, does not depend on time and state {kx, ky}. In addition, only
the better blueprint max{kx, ky} matters to profit flows. Specifically, better
quality can generate a larger profit as in (2.8). The argument runs as follows.
Given any state {kx, ky}, the monopoly considers allocating a total cost of c
on innovations to expectedly further max{kx, ky} the most in the next period.
Recall that the expected step function λs(λ) is strictly increasing and convex
in the effort. Consequently, it is the most beneficial to spend all of the effort
on the technology edge. In particular, when kx = ky ≥ 0, it is optimal for the
monopoly to innovate only x.
We have just claimed that the monopoly innovates only x from the
beginning. Given the reduced state kx, the Bellman equation is
V M (kx) = max
λx≥0
{





M (k′x) = λxV
M (k+x ) + (1− λx)V M (kx), and k+x = kx + s(λx)
when the R&D project succeeds. The Euler equation is (the subscripts denote
derivatives)

















where equality holds if λx > 0. It is observed that, by the envelop theorem,
V M (kx) inherits the concavity from Π
M (kx).
Equation (2.9) specifies a standard dynamic programming problem
which has a unique solution. Far into the future, if at kx ≥ k∗, the opti-
mal investment intensity is apparently zero, and {ΠM (k∗) , V M(k∗)} are well
specified. Thus, by backward induction the monopoly can solve for the entire
time path of its optimal innovation efforts.
There exists a know-how level k∗M ≤ k∗ on and beyond which the
monopoly does not want to invest. Clearly, at k∗ and beyond, the second
term of the LHS of (2.10) is virtually zero and the monopoly has no incentive
to progress. Even though limλx→0 c
′(λx) = 0, if V
M





towards 0 fast enough, the monopoly stops innovations before reaching k∗. In
addition, we observe that
Proposition 2.3.2. In the monopoly structure, for the range of kx where
λx > 0, the optimal investment intensity is decreasing in kx.
Proof. This is an application of the implicit function theorem, based on the
concavity of the profit function and the second-order condition (SOC) of the
Bellman equation (Appendix A.4).
Social Welfare. With a quasi-linear utility form, social welfare is the
sum of consumer utility and monopoly profit in numeraire units. At each state
kx, consumer utility in equilibrium and the flow of social welfare respectively
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are UM (kx) = u(θxb/px) + B − b and ΦM (kx) = UM(kx) + ΠM (kx) − c(λx).
















− c(λx) +B. (2.12)
Thus, the discounted life-time social welfare with a monopoly structure is
defined recursively as follows
WM (kx) =
1
1− β (1− λx)
{






where λx = λx(kx) ≥ 0 and k+x = kx +s(λx(kx)). It is easy to find the maximal





Based on (2.13) and (2.14), we can establish the time path of life-time social
welfare backward from the maximal know-how stock k∗m, and calculate the ex
ante value WM (0).
2.3.3 Duopoly Pricing and Investment
For tractability, no entry and exit are allowed. In particular, a firm
making zero profit can stay forever in the market. The two firms compete to
gain market share in each period and race to have product supremacy.
Static Pricing. As noted earlier, price decisions do not have effects
on investments. Thus, both firms will charge a price no less than unit cost,
i.e. px ≥ w and py ≥ w. If quality levels are equal, the duopoly firms play a
standard Bertrand game in which equilibrium prices are w, each firm produces
half of the quantity demanded, and both make zero profits.
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The case of different quality levels is more interesting. Knowing con-
sumer behavior and conditional on quality levels, each firm wants to monopo-
lize the market by choosing a price which constitutes an infinitesimally lower
QAP. This competition behavior is rational because the price effect is very
small while the market share effect is very large. As X and Y try to cut down
each other in QAP bit by bit, the laggard will hit the lower bound w first, and
hence the front-runner with product supremacy has the advantage in pricing.
Specifically, the front-runner will choose a price such that its QAP is ε less
than that of the laggard at the lower bound. We assume that the equilibrium
market share holds at the limit as ε → 0. In addition, the laggard produces
no output and potentially charges a price equal unit cost w in equilibrium.
If X is the front-runner, the firm monopolizes the market by confining
its price such that




This strategic monopoly will then pick the price that maximizes its one-period
profit. The earlier analysis shows that the profit function in price of an absolute
monopoly has a single peak. The strategic monopoly puts the constraints in




w/ (1− σ) if 1/ (1− σ) ≤ θx/θy
(θx/θy)w if 1/ (1− σ) > θx/θy.
(2.16)
Recall that θx = θ(kx) and θy = θ(ky). Plugging the optimal price in (2.16) into
the profit function in (2.6), we have the profit function of the front-runner.
In the first case, i.e. 1/ (1− σ) ≤ θx/θy, it is shown earlier that the profit
function is increasing in kx. In the second case, i.e. 1/ (1− σ) > θx/θy, price
px is increasing in θx and decreasing in θy. Consequently, as the price is on
the increasing side of a single-peaked profit function, equilibrium profit of a
front-runner is increasing in kx and decreasing in ky. In this second case, the
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where ω = (kx, ky). In combination of the equal and unequal quality cases, let
ΠD (ω), be the profit function of firm X. Observe that ΠD (ω) = 0 if kx = ky,
and ΠD (ω) > 0 if kx > ky. Thus, total profit of the duopoly is either zero or
equal the profit of the front-runner.
Dynamic Investment. As mentioned earlier, we look for MPE of the
game. Markov strategies are strategies that depend only on payoff-relevant
information of the history up to the current period. Maskin & Tirole (2001)
define MPE to be equilibria in Markov strategies. In our problem, the payoff-
relevant information in each period is the state ω = (kx, ky). The firms base
exclusively on this information set to play and not on how they reach that
information set. Specifically, given ω and λy, the Bellman equation for X is
V D (ω) = max
λx≥0
{
ΠD (ω)− c (λx) + βE(λx,λy)V D (ω′)
}
, (2.18)
where ω′ = (k′x, k
′
y), and for k
+
x = kx + s(λx), k
+















(kx, ky) with (1− λx) (1− λy) .
By the same token, given ω and λx, Y also has the same Bellman equation as
in (2.18) with necessary changes in the index labels.
Definition 2.3.3. A symmetric MPE in pure strategies of the duopoly R&D
game is the investment function λ(·), which is associated with the discounted
life-time profit V D(·), such that for any state ω = (kx, ky) ∈ Ω ⊂ R2: given
that firm Y follows the policy rule λ(·), firm X finds λ(·) as the optimal de-
cisions for the problem in (2.18); and vice versa, given that X plays λ(·), Y
also finds it optimal to follow λ(·).
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We are interested in the existence, uniqueness, and characterizations
of the possible equilibria. Existence and uniqueness of MPE are discussed in
Maskin & Tirole (2001) and Doraszelski & Satterthwaite (2007). In the current
environment, the policy function λ(·) is bounded by construction. Thus, we
expect that an MPE in pure strategies exists. The current setup does not
support closed-form solutions to the R&D game. However, we can address
existence and uniqueness in a special way. It is noted that an MPE must
satisfy the subgame perfection argument. The existence of the threshold k∗
means that equilibrium behaviors on and beyond a set of nodes, which lie on
all possible paths of the game, can be constructed. Behaviors in earlier nodes
can then be solved by backward induction.
Figure 2.2: Duopoly: backward induction
Specifically, the backward induction argument is illustrated by Figure
2.2, which describes a 2-dimensional state space of know-how stocks. From
each point ω = (kx, ky), the two firms consider moving upwards and to the
right. Recall that beyond k∗ firms cannot raise their quality indices. The state
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space is partitioned into areas A, B, C, and D, in which we need to solve for
the decision rule and value function.
First, in areas A, B, and C, we know that both firms have no incentive
to invest at all, and their value function is ΠD(ω)/(1 − β). More specifically,
in area A both firms cannot raise consumers’ valuation by accumulating more
know-how and hence make zero profit. In area B, firm X does not invest
because it is already beyond k∗, and firm Y—the laggard—does not want to
make losses all the way to area A, where the expected profit is zero. By the
same token, no firms invest in area C.
Second, equilibrium value and investment functions in areaD are solved
by backward induction, which is illustrated by the arrows. Without loss of
generality, the reference firm is X. Let ω̃ be the permuted state of ω, i.e.
ω̃ = (ky, kx). Starting at the top right corner, firm X goes horizontally for
lower ky before going vertically for lower kx. Observe that at each point ω,
future equilibrium investments and the associated value functions are known
to X. However, X does not know its value function and the competitor’s
decision at the current state ω. By symmetry, the competitor’s decision at
ω is the same as firm X’s decision at ω̃, which is currently unknown. That
means X needs to find its optimal investments at ω and ω̃ simultaneously. For
this reason, the state-dependent consideration forX is called the pairwise fixed
point problem, which is a component of the entire R&D game. Based on (2.18)
and the corresponding FOC (Appendix A.5), the best response functions of
firm X with respect to firm Y ’s decisions at ω and ω̃ can be constructed. Thus,
existence and uniqueness of the whole R&D game depend on the number of
crossing points between these two best response functions, which vary across
area D. Specifically, we have existence and uniqueness if and only if the single
crossing property holds for each point on the state space. In the next section,
we will implement this backward induction solution in a discrete game.
20
Social Welfare. At each state ω = (kx, ky), the flow of social welfare
is ΦD(ω) = UD(ω) + ΠD(ω) − c(λx) − c(λy), where UD(ω) is consumers’ one
period utility. For kx ≥ ky, UD(ω) = u(θxb/px)+B−b. For kx < ky, UD(ω) =
u(θyb/py) + B − b. Recall that there are two cases of front-runner pricing
depending on where θx/θy lies relative to 1/(1 − σ). It is more interesting to
focus on the second case where θx/θy < 1/(1 − σ) always holds. Under this




















− c (λx)− c (λy) +B. (2.20)
Recursively, the discounted life-time social welfare function in ω is
WD (ω) = ΦD(ω) + βE(λx,λy)W
D (ω′) , (2.21)
where ω′ and the integration E(λx,λy) are defined in (2.18), and {λx, λy} follow
λ(·) which is an MPE in Definition 2.3.3. Social welfare value WD (ω) for
ω at points in areas A, B, and C (Figure 2.2) can trivially be specified. By
backward induction, we can calculate the ex ante social welfare WD (0, 0).
2.3.4 The Social Planner
The social planner’s objective is to maximize consumers’ discounted
life-time utility by controlling firms’ pricing and investment activities. As in
the monopoly structure, the social planner needs to produce and innovate only
one product line, assumably x. Given the quality θx, the social planner charges
a price equal unit cost w in every period. The one-period utility function is










In (2.22), US(kx) is increasing and concave in kx. The social planner solves
the following Bellman equation
V S (kx) = max
λx≥0
{




S (k′x) = λxV
S (k+x ) + (1− λx)V S (kx). The FOC of (2.23) is

















where equality holds for λx > 0. Again, by the envelop theorem, V
S
1 (kx) =
US1 (kx) > 0 and V
S
11 (kx) = U
S
11(kx) < 0. Like in the monopoly, we have
Proposition 2.3.4. Under the social planner, in the range of kx such that
λx(kx) > 0, investment effort is decreasing in kx, i.e. λ
′
x(kx) < 0.
Proof. The argument follows the same line as in Proposition 2.3.2.
In this structure, observe that the discounted social welfare W S(kx) =
V S (kx). Let k
∗
S be the threshold on and beyond which the social planner
does not find it beneficial to innovate. The maximal long-run social welfare is
W S(k∗S). By backward induction, we can also find ex ante social value W
S(0).
2.3.5 Comparisons of Social Welfare




GD(kx, ky) = U
D(kx) + Π
D(kx) for kx ≥ ky;
and ΦGS(kx) = U
S(kx)+Π






























In comparison of the three market structures, there are some observations.
First, ΦGS(kx) > Φ
GM(kx). This result comes from the fact that (2 − σ)(1 −
σ)(1−σ)/σ is an increasing function ranging from 0.75 to near 1 for σ ∈ [1
2
, 1).
Second, ΦGS(kx) ≥ ΦGD(kx, ky). The reason is ΦGD(kx, ky) is increasing ky
which is bounded by kx. In addition, when kx = ky, Φ
GS(kx) = Φ
GD(kx, ky).
Third, ΦGD(kx, ky) > Φ
GM(kx). To see why, note that the ordering between










which is increasing in θy/θx ∈ [1/θ∗, 1], and
σ (2− σ) (1− σ)1/σ−2 .
Recall that θx/θy is bounded from above by 1/(1 − σ), i.e. θ∗ < 1/(1 − σ),
which implies 1/θ∗ > (1 − σ). When θy/θx = (1 − σ), the two expressions
are equal. Thus, in the range [1/θ∗, 1], the former is strictly greater than the




D(kx) for kx = ky. In combination, we
have established
Lemma 2.3.5. For θ∗ < 1/(1 − σ), and kx ≥ ky, ΦGS(kx) ≥ ΦGD(kx, ky) >
ΦGM(kx), which means gross social welfare flow is the largest under the social
planner and smallest under monopoly. In addition, utility components of these
functions also have the similar ordering, i.e. US(kx) ≥ UD(kx) > UM(kx).
Proposition 2.3.6. The social planner dominates monopoly in both dynamic
social welfare and R&D efforts, i.e. W S(kx) > W
M(kx) and λ
S(kx) ≥ λM(kx)
∀kx. In addition, the social planner dominates duopoly in social welfare, i.e.
W S(kx) ≥ WD(kx, ky) ∀kx ≥ ky.
Proof. Appendix A.6.
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At this point, we do not have analytical solution to the duopoly prob-
lem. Hence, further comparison results need to rely on different numerical
exercises in the next sections.
2.4 Numerical Characterizations
Based on specific parametrization, this section further characterizes in-
vestment behaviors and welfare properties of the three allocation mechanisms,
i.e. a monopoly, a duopoly, and the social planner, in the linear substitu-
tion case (α = 1). As the focus is theoretical analyses, we do not attempt
to calibrate the model to any specific markets. The benchmark values of the
parameters are summarized in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1: Benchmark parameter values
Description Specification
Curvature of CRRA utility σ = 0.8
Curvature of CES sub-utility α = 1
Interest rate r = 5%
Intertemporal discount factor β = 0.952
Consumer budget B = 0
Production cost w = 1
Know-how space k ∈ {0, 1, .., 2000}, k∗ = 1800
Valuation function θ(k) = γkδ + 1, γ = 0.4, δ = 0.25
Choice of success rate λ ∈ {0, .01, .02, .., 1}
Innovation step function s(λ) = ψλ, ψ = 100
Innovation cost function c(λ) = κ λ
(1−λ)η , κ = 0.02, η = 5
There are some notes on the choice of parameter values. First, the
CRRA utility function is concave, i.e. σ < 1. This condition means con-
sumers will demand more of a product if its quality is increasing. In addition,
σ ≥ 1
2
holds to guarantee that one-period profit functions are concave. Sec-
ond, the interest rate is assumed to be at the annual level r = 5% which is
often used by the literature. The discount factor then follows β = 1/(1 + r).
24
It is noted that period length is not necessarily one year. Third, the budget
constraint B does not play any role at this point and is normalized to be zero.
Fourth, production cost w is set at 1 for simplicity. Fifth, the know-how space
is composed of integers in [0, 2000], and hence the state space Ω is a discrete
grid. Sixth, the curvature of the valuation function lies in δ, and (γ, δ) are
chosen to guarantee θ∗ < 1/(1 − σ). In addition, the valuation function is
normalized so that the lowest quality is 1. Seventh, for compatibility, the step
function maps each λ to exactly a point on the know-how space, and the pa-
rameter ψ governs the step sizes. Eighth, in the innovation cost function, η
determines the curvature and κ plays the role of a scale. Finally, given the
benchmark know-how space, the three characteristic functions, i.e. valuation,
innovation step, and innovation cost, are constructed so that firms stop inno-
vations relatively long before reaching k∗. The reason is that if it is optimal
to innovate in the proximity of k∗, the investment functions in that prox-
imity become bumpy and look like waves bouncing from a seawall. Clearly,
this phenomenon comes from the abrupt change in the valuation curvature
at k∗. Alternatively, given the characteristic functions, we can expand the
state space to avoid this phenomenon. However, a larger state space means a
heavier computational burden, especially in the duopoly case.
2.4.1 Social Planner vs. Monopoly
We begin with the comparison between the social planner and monopoly
in terms of innovation efforts and social welfare. The comparison is simplified
as these allocation mechanisms evolve effectively in one dimension (kx).
R&D efforts and social welfare are presented in Figures 2.3 and 2.4.
There are some major results in this comparison. First, as shown earlier,
both the social planner and monopoly reduce their innovation efforts over
the know-how space, and eventually hit some points beyond which no further
25
Figure 2.3: Social planner vs. monopoly: R&D intensity
Note: α = 1; social planner investment follows (2.24); monopoly in-
vestment follows (2.10). Planner always makes more R&D effort than
monopoly.
investments are beneficial. Second, the social planner always exerts more ef-
fort on innovations and reaches a higher maximal know-how stock than the
monopoly. It is noted that the social planner makes innovation decisions based
on a flow function larger and steeper than monopoly one-period profit. Third,
though with more expenditures on R&D, the social planner generates higher
life-time social welfare than the monopoly. The reason is that the net social
welfare flows are higher under the social planner. In addition, the social plan-
ner has more chance to succeed in R&D projects and hence more effectively
avoids wasteful investments than the monopoly. Thus, at the beginning, i.e.
kx = 0, ex ante social welfare under the social planner is larger than that
under monopoly. Moreover, in the long run, the economy reaches a higher
steady-state quality level and social welfare under the former than under the
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Figure 2.4: Social planner vs. monopoly: social welfare
Note: α = 1; planner welfare follows (2.23); monopoly welfare follows
(2.13); the dots mark the maximal social welfare levels.
latter (the dots in Figure 2.4).
2.4.2 Duopoly Behavior
Static Pricing. In the linear substitution case, product supremacy
is all that matters. Figure 2.5 illustrates the pricing behavior and profit of
firm X. As a laggard, X ties its price at w and makes a zero profit. As
a front-runner, the firm can charge a higher price which is subject to the
quality ratio. Specifically, the front-runner’s price and profit become higher
if its relative quality increases. Note that the curvature of price and profit
functions along kx comes from consumers’ valuation.
Dynamic Investment. As discussed earlier, solving for an MPE of the
entire R&D game boils down to solving for a Nash equilibrium in every state
ω ∈ Ω, following a backward induction fashion. Recall that given ω = (kx, ky),
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Figure 2.5: Duopoly: price and profit functions (firm X)
(A) (B)
Note: α = 1; θ∗< 1/(1− σ); price follows (2.16); profit follows (2.17).
Higher quality levels lead to higher prices (A) and higher profits (B).
behaviors at weakly higher states {ω′} are already known, for ω′ = (k′x, k′y),
k′x ≥ kx, k′y ≥ ky, and at least one of the inequalities is strict. In addition,
in every state ω, by symmetry, we need to find the fixed point of the R&D
game between firm X and itself at the permuted state ω̃. In this game, players
choose the R&D intensity λ in a compact set, i.e. [0, 1].
The numerical algorithm for finding the fixed points is based on a simple
interpretation of the Nash equilibrium concept. It runs as follows: given any
state ω, construct the best response functions of the two firms and find the
fixed point on a grid choice space. In implementation, most of the state games
have exact fixed points. For the state games which do not have exact fixed
points, we approximate the equilibrium with the closest grid point which is
not Pareto dominated.
There are some distinguished features of the numerical equilibrium play.
First, a firm may have expected positive value even when lagging in the market
(Figure 2.6). The reason is that if the know-how gap is not too large, the lag-
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Figure 2.6: Duopoly: value and investment functions (firm X)
(A) (B)
Note: α = 1; value follows (2.18); investment follows Definition 2.3.3.
In (A), higher firm values come from higher quality levels. In (B), X
only invests in a bounded region; R&D efforts are decreasing in kx;
competition escalades in the diagonal region.
gard has some chance to catch up with the front-runner via R&D investments.
Figure 2.7 shows the region where the laggard still wants to catch up. Second,
if too far behind, the laggard does not invest in R&D. Third, the R&D race is
the most intensified when firms are close to each other, especially when they
have equal know-how stocks. In other words, firms really want to break the
balance to have an advantage in pricing. By comparing Figures 2.3 and 2.6
(panel B), given kx = ky which are both low, a duopoly firm invests more than
the social planner at kx. Forth, even though the front-runner can leave the lag-
gard so far behind that the laggard will never invest in R&D, the front-runner
still has incentives to invest as it can raise the quality ratio for larger profits.
Fifth, investment incentive generally decreases in know-how stock, reflecting
the decreasing marginal valuation of consumers. When consumers appreciate
quality improvements the most, i.e. for low know-how stocks or fresh market,
firms invest intensively. When increases in know-how stock cannot raise much
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Figure 2.7: Duopoly: investment boundaries (firm X)
Note: α = 1; upper curve specifies {maximal kx}; lower curve & diag-
onal make up the catching up region. Duopoly technology frontier lies
between those of the social planner and monopoly.
consumers’ valuation, i.e. the market becomes mature, no firms invest in R&D.
Specifically, Figure 2.7 illustrates the boundary beyond which a front-runner
no longer wants to innovate. It can be seen that if the competitor ends up
with low quality level, firm X does not have much incentives to progress far.
However, if the two firms make relatively equal progress, they may push the
frontier close to the social planner’s maximal know-how stock.
Social Welfare. Figure 2.8 shows how the duopoly social welfare
function looks like. It is symmetric with respect to the diagonal where the
firms have equal product quality and consumers benefit the most. In addition,
the boundary along which the society can effectively achieve maximal welfare
value is defined by the technology frontier in Figure 2.7 (X is the front-runner).
Generally, the duopoly welfare function is increasing in kx and ky. How-
ever, it is cleaved a long the diagonal region. Given some ky and in the neigh-
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Figure 2.8: Duopoly: social welfare function
Note: α = 1; social welfare follows (2.21). The function has a trench
along the diagonal where firms make a lot of wasteful investments.
borhood where kx ≤ ky, the social welfare function becomes flat. When kx
passes ky, the function becomes steeper, and again increasing and concave in
kx. That is when neck-and-neck, firms intensify their competition effort and
make a lot of wasteful investments from the point of view of the society.
2.4.3 Mechanisms: Innovation and Social Welfare
We compare the three allocation mechanisms here. First, Figure 2.7
shows an important result: the duopoly technology frontier is lower than that
of the social planner and higher than that of the monopoly. This means the
long-run social welfare of the mechanisms follows the same ordering (Figure
2.9). It is interesting that if the duopoly firms always advance together in
equilibrium, they can drive social welfare to the level by the social planner.
Second, the ex ante social welfare value is the highest under the social planner
and lowest under monopoly. Specifically, the ex ante social welfare values
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under the social planner, a duopoly, and a monopoly respectively are EWS =
102, EWD = 98, and EWM = 80. Third, allocation mechanism does matter
to the rates of technological progress. The monopoly is the slowest. The order
between the social planner and a duopoly depends on where the firms are in
the state space. A duopoly in the diagonal region advances more quickly than
a social planner with the same latest technology.
Figure 2.9: Comparison of maximal welfare
Note: α = 1; social planner and monopoly only innovate x and keep
ky= 0; duopoly technology frontier is that of front-runner X . Duopoly
ranks lower than social planner and higher than monopoly in maximal
social welfare.
In combination of the results: the social planner benefits the economy
the most; a duopoly may generate an outcome in terms of technology and
welfare comparable to that by the social planner, but not always; and the
monopoly is definitely the least desirable. This welfare result means that
more static and dynamic competition benefits the society in both the short
run and long run.
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2.5 Nonlinear Substitution
We have analyzed investment behaviors and social welfare properties
for the linear substitution case. In this section, the same considerations are
extended to the nonlinear substitution case, where α ∈ (0, 1). In fact, analyses
with nonlinear substitution are much more costly than those with linear sub-
stitution. We will present numerical results associated with α = 0.8. We want
to see if the previous key conclusions are invariant to product substitutability.
For the most part, the formulations of pricing and investment problems
are similar to those in the linear substitution case (Appendix A.7). However,
there are some major differences. First, consumers always want to consume
both products x and y, making the demand function smoother. Thus, the
monopoly and social planner will produce and innovate both products in every
period. Two, the setup does not support closed form solutions to the static
problems, especially the duopoly pricing game. These mean that we have to
rely more on computations to characterize the nonlinear substitution case.
Before investigating investment behavior and social welfare, we need
to understand the role of quality in profit maximization. Under monopoly,
quality does not affect optimal prices for large B, which also holds for the
linear substitution case. However, quality has the budget share effects, i.e.
higher quality attracts more expenditure from consumers. This is the incentive
for quality innovation under monopoly. Under duopoly, the market share for
each firm and consumer expenditure are both tied to quality levels. In fact, a
firm’s one-period profit is increasing in its product quality and decreasing in
that of the rival (Figure A.2, panel A). For this reason, firms are motivated to
improve their own product quality. Different from the market power incentive,
the sole interest of the social planner is raising consumers’ utility through
quality innovation. In this section, Figures 2.10 and 2.11 will provide the main
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comparisons. Further details about each allocation mechanism are presented
in Appendix A.9.
Figure 2.10: Technology frontiers (product x)
Note: α = 0.8. The frontiers show the maximal know-how stocks be-
yond which firm X , under different market structures, will no longer
innovate product x. The same holds for product y.
Figure 2.10 representatively shows the technology frontier of product
x, beyond which no firms want to make R&D efforts. First, the monopoly’s
frontier is low while that of the social planner is much higher. However, the
two mechanisms share the same pattern of decreasing innovation efforts along
kx (Appendix A.9). This common feature is intuitive for a concave valuation
function. Interestingly, second, the duopoly frontier is not always lower than
the planner counterpart. If the stochastic evolution in equilibrium is unbal-
anced, the duopoly may end up with a product with very high quality (even
higher than under the social planner) and the other with low quality. The
reason is that if the competitor is not lucky in its R&D projects and stays
at low product quality, firm X will find it easy to raise its relative quality.
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Figure 2.11: Maximal social welfare (x frontier)
Note: α = 0.8. Maximal welfare values are associated with the technol-
ogy frontiers in Figure 2.10.
As a sole innovator, neither a social planner nor a monopoly has incentives to
progress in an unbalanced fashion, even though they may end up with unequal
quality states as the economy evolves stochastically.
Thus the linear and nonlinear substitution cases differ greatly in duopoly
innovation behavior. First, for a low ky, firm X invests to improve its product
longer with nonlinear substitution than with linear substitution. In addition,
firm X’s innovation intensity is increasing in ky with linear substitution, while
the reverse holds with nonlinear substitution. This difference is intuitive. In
the linear substitution case, a firm too far behind abandons R&D efforts all
together, and the front-runner can sustain its leadership without much effort.
As the laggard lands at a higher quality level, the front-runner needs to in-
novate its product up to some optimal point, making the frontier increasing.
In contrary, the laggard with nonlinear substitution can always make positive
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profits because consumers demand its product. Consequently, the laggard has
greater incentives in raising its market share via quality innovation. Knowing
this, the front-runner will need to make more efforts to have a greater lead.
As the additional curvature for α < 1 makes it more costly to raise relative
quality, a firm’s investment frontier is decreasing in product quality of its rival.
For example, for a low ky, firm X finds it easy to have greater lead and has
a high frontier. However, for a higher ky, it is not beneficial for firm X to go
as far. When X is a laggard and ky is increasing, the firm’s marginal benefits
from innovation is smaller and smaller. Second, R&D efforts are not intensified
when firms are neck-and-neck with nonlinear substitution. The reason is that
the laggard does not have to face a hazard of making zero future profits as in
the linear substitution case.
Finally, the social welfare functions of all three market structures are
increasing and concave in ω (Appendix A.9). As firms do not intensify invest-
ments when they are neck-and-neck, the social welfare function is not cleaved
as in the linear substitution case. There are some main comparative results.
First, welfare values conditional on states are unambiguously ordered. Specif-
ically, given any state ω, it is always beneficial to switch from duopoly to
the social planner or from monopoly to duopoly. This implies ex ante social
welfare value is highest under the social planner and lowest under monopoly,
which also holds in the linear substitution case. Second, maximal social wel-
fare value depends on where the economy lands along the technology frontier
(Figure 2.11). Specifically, monopoly always generates the smallest social wel-
fare. In dynamics, the duopoly may generate higher welfare than the social
planner. However, in the long run, the latter benefits the economy the most.
Though there are differences in terms of duopoly investment behavior,
the linear and nonlinear substitution cases share the same policy message that
more competitiveness benefits the economy.
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2.6 Further Discussions
We consider some issues related to the choice of parameters and mod-
eling in this section. First is how the results will change if we vary the key
parameters regarding innovation step and cost functions. In general, vary-
ing the innovation technology does not affect the comparative results between
different allocation mechanisms, given linear substitution or nonlinear substi-
tution. In particular, if it is easier to innovate, i.e. the step function is higher
or the cost function is lower, firms will make higher innovation efforts, given
some state ω. It is noted that the continuous step function is implemented on
a grid space. Thus, any change in the step function has to satisfy the condition
that intensity decisions advance the state to exact grid points.
Second, we do not have to vary the valuation function to see how the
model works, because its curvature varies with know-how stocks. Specifically,
for each market structure and substitution degree, the key determinant behind
innovation incentives is the curvature of the valuation function. For low know-
how stocks, where the valuation function is steep, the marginal benefits of
innovation is large and firms make great R&D efforts. In the long run, as the
valuation function is flat, firms have small incentives in product improvements.
Third, the current choice of the threshold k∗ is a technical assumption
which makes the solution concepts more understandable and keeps the state
space small enough for computational purposes. The key welfare results do
not depend on the choice of k∗. Ideally, k∗ should be chosen so that the
corresponding slope of the valuation function, i.e. θ′(k∗), is smaller than any
other magnitudes considered in R&D problems. For a large k∗, investment
decisions are not subject to bouncing effects and look smoother. However, as
k∗ is increasing, the computational burden grows exponentially. Thus we have
to make a trade off between smoothness and computational feasibility.
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Fourth, we do not consider the dependence of production cost w on
know-how stock. If unit cost is increasing in quality, we also expect that
innovation intensity is decreasing. In empirical work, changes in production
cost may be needed to make the model match with data. However, in this
study, the assumption of an invariant unit cost is necessary to keep the model
focus on quality innovation. In addition, real-life developments show that
quality innovation is not necessarily associated with higher production cost.
For simplicity, we also keep the innovation technology, i.e. innovation step and
cost functions, independent of know-how stock.
Fifth, states are not allowed to move backwards. This assumption
facilitates backward induction solutions and differentiates the current study
with the existing literature, e.g. Pakes & McGuire (1994) and Doraszelski
(2003). Clearly, the evolution rule, according to which a state ω follows, does
influence firms’ innovation incentives. In general, given the same effective
state space Ω, the measure of ω such that some firm does not invest is larger
with the nondecreasing state assumption. In addition, the long-run outcomes,
especially in technology frontier, are different.
Finally, we restrict the game theoretic equilibrium concepts to Nash
and MPE. Finer concepts which may rely on Folk’s theorem are beyond the
scope of our current interest. Those finer considerations demand much more
elaborations and are left for future work.
2.7 Conclusion
Our main purpose is analyzing how different allocation mechanisms
affect the quality innovation efforts and social welfare. The key technology
structure is that firms can choose continuous innovation step to progress in
the next period and state variables are non-decreasing. There are some main
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results. First, in the linear substitution case, the planner technology frontier
is always superior to the counterparts under duopoly and monopoly. Second,
in the nonlinear substitution case, a duopoly may follow an unbalanced evo-
lution path and have a technology frontier not dominated by that under the
social planner. Third, social welfare values are always highest under the social
planner and lowest under monopoly.
We can extend the model in at least several ways. On one hand, some
of them may not add much intuition to the current results. On the other,
some potential extensions deserve separate research projects. Consequently,
we keep the model as simple as possible to focus on the effects of allocation
mechanism on innovation and welfare.
The analysis again advocates for the virtue of competition. Competi-
tion puts a downward pressure on prices and provides the incentives for firms
to repeatedly expand the technology frontier, raising social welfare. At the
same time, it should be borne in mind that intensified competition may lead
to wasteful allocation of resources.
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Chapter 3
Inference of Quality Innovation
3.1 Introduction
Relative prices are understood as conversion rates between commodity
bundles of different countries or sectors. In standard growth and business-cycle
models, relative prices vary due only to productivity shocks. Ceteris paribus,
relative price and relative quantity, which is driven by relative productivity,
should have a negative correlation. That is as we consume more of some
product, marginal utility and hence relative price of that product will decrease.
This negative correlation does not fully hold for the case of US services versus
US goods from 1946-2006 (Figure 3.1): while services-goods relative quantity
fluctuates, the relative price steadily increases over time, suggesting that the
standard models may miss something important in the economy.
Potentially, there are other important sources of dynamics besides pro-
ductivity. Among those is quality innovation–changes in utility level given the
same consumption quantity. In the current study, we allow the coexistence of
productivity shock and quality innovation, which are both exogenous. Given
this coexistence, the study addresses three closely related questions: (i) with
data on relative prices and potentially other variables, how can we separate
the effects of productivity shock and quality innovation? (ii) given the sep-
aration, how are they individually and jointly characterized for the US, i.e.
volatility, persistence, correlation and causation? and finally (iii) what are the
implications of the separation exercise to a certain set of business-cycle and
growth models?
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The study shows that based on a simple general equilibrium model, we
can separate productivity and quality. Specifically, we can infer relative quality
changes using time series of relative prices and budget shares. In addition,
with a Vector Auto Regressive (VAR) model, we can analyze the dynamic
relationship between productivity and quality. The empirical results based on
US data show that quality innovation plays an important role in variations
of the services-goods relative price, and productivity shock alone cannot fully
explain the behavior of this relative price. This implies that models with
only productivity shocks may generate misleading results. Stockman & Tesar
(1995) reported that the addition of a taste shock between tradeables and non-
tradeables helps better explain some international stylized facts which are hard
to arrive at with productivity shock alone.
There is a new and growing literature on inferring quality from price
information. Klenow (2003) provided a detailed critical review on the efforts
by different statistical agencies in separating quality improvements from price
changes, and gave some practical suggestions. Bils & Klenow (2004) decom-
posed inflation in unit prices of 66 US durable consumer goods into quality and
pure-price effects. Hummels & Klenow (2005) looked at many countries’ de-
tailed exports data and found that richer countries charge higher prices which
result from better quality. Hallak (2006) retrieved quality from export unit
prices at the sectoral level and confirmed the theoretical prediction that rich
countries buy relatively more from countries of high quality goods. The major
weakness of this literature is that quality is retrieved either with a focus on
prices alone or with inadequate specifications of sectoral production.
In this empirical quality literature, the closest work to the current study
is Hallak & Schott (2005). They used relative prices and sectoral trade bal-
ances to decompose export unit value into quality and non-quality compo-
nents. Their argument is: given a common international price for some sector,
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a country has a positive trade balance for that sector if its quality is higher
than that of the trading partner. This argument does not always hold. For
example, in a simple world where quality levels are the same and the law of
one price holds, we can see non-zero sectoral trade balances: subject to dispro-
portional quantities of sectoral endowments, countries benefit from net selling
some product and net purchasing another. Moreover, their argument is hard
to be extended to the aggregate level: overall trade balances partly reflect
intertemporal consumption smoothing, which is not related to quality.
Our study has an aspect similar to that of the huge literature on de-
mand empirics: looking at implications of utility maximization. However, the
objectives of our study and those of the literature on demand empirics are
different. The empirical demand literature has two major lines: (i) parametric
approach in different flexible forms, e.g. the path-breaking paper by Diewert
(1971) and a good empirical comparison by Fisher et al. (2001); and (ii) non-
parametric approach with the generalized axiom of revealed preferences, e.g.
Varian (1982, 1983). Both of these lines are concerned with the consistency
between preference axioms and aggregate data. Our focus is on how aggregate
quality is changing over time. Under the hypothesis that quality does change,
the tests in parametric and nonparametric approaches have some problems.
First, in different flexible forms of utility or indirect utility, consumption quan-
tities are the only objects that evolve over time and all parameters are fixed.
If quality and hence marginal utility are evolving, the parameters in those
specifications should change, i.e. each period has some preference structure
which is consistent with data of that period only. Consequently, with inten-
sity in parameters, different flexible forms are hard to be properly implemented
with aggregate data to capture quality innovation. Second, if quality varies
and therefore the set of commodities evolve over time, we cannot apply the
test of generalized axiom of revealed preferences when preferences may be
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quite different between periods. For these reasons, we rely on the parsimony
in parameters to track quality changes and choose the constant elasticity of
substitution (CES) utility function.
We focus on relative productivity and quality at the aggregate level and
have some contributions to the literature. First, separation of productivity
shock and quality innovation is based on relative prices and budget shares.
This means that the retrieval of quality innovation fully takes preference and
technology into account. Second, measures for goodness of fit, which tell how
much productivity shock and quality innovation explain relative price and
budget share, are developed. Based on these measures, we also know how
important the measurement errors are in a specific economic context. Third,
via an application, we know the evolution of US services-goods relative quality
from 1946-2006. Fourth, by imposing a VAR structure on relative productivity
shock and quality innovation, we have some insights on their individual and
joint properties, which will serve as moments for further studies.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 lays out the
basic environment and focuses on productivity and quality information possi-
bly borne by relative price variations. Section 3.3 extends the basic model by
using both relative price and budget share to deal with measurement problems.
The main result is an inference procedure for retrieving the relative quality
index. Section 3.4 applies the methods developed earlier to US services-goods
data. From this empirical analysis, we learn about the evolution and impor-
tance of quality innovation in the US context. Finally, we close the study with
some remarks.
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3.2 An Endowment Economy
3.2.1 The Basic Model
We have an economy populated by a unit measure of identical agents.
In each period, the agents are endowed with commodities a and b and they can
freely trade those endowments to satisfy their need. A typical agent i ∈ [0, 1]









subject to the budget constraint
ait + ptbit = eait + ptebit, (3.2)
where (ait, bit) are consumption quantities; (αt, βt) are positive quality indices
of commodities a and b, respectively; (eait, ebit) are endowment quantities; pt
is the relative price which denotes the amount of commodity a needed to trade
for a unit of commodity b; and θ = 1− 1/σ, where σ is the constant elasticity
of substitution (absolute value). In the literature, θ is called the substitution
parameter. As the elasticity of substitution σ belongs to [0,∞), the substitu-
tion parameter θ lives in (−∞, 1]. Essentially, we have a CES utility function
in which effective consumption quantity is a product of quantity and quality.
In this paper, changes in (αt, βt) are interpreted as quality innovation rather
than taste shock. It is hard to interpret taste shock as a synchronized event
happening to all agents, especially with a time length unit of one year or more.
However, quality innovation can come from competition and imitation in pro-
duction. With the restricted space of {αt, βt, θ}, marginal utilities are positive
and decreasing. In addition, the utility function satisfies the Inada condition.
The CES specification in (3.1) covers a broad range of substitutability.
Arrow et al. (1961) showed that: (i) CES is fixed-proportion Leontief (σ = 0)
for θ = −∞; (ii) CES is inelastic (0 < σ < 1) for θ ∈ (−∞, 0); (iii) CES
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becomes Cobb-Douglas (σ = 1) for θ = 0; (iv) CES is elastic (1 < σ <∞) for
θ ∈ (0, 1); and CES has straight-line indifference curves (σ = ∞) for θ = 1. In
addition, the desired budget share for, without loss of generality, commodity
a is a positive function of the coefficient αθt .
On the technology side, total endowment quantities in any period t are
Eat = At (3.3)
Ebt = Bt, (3.4)
where the quantity ratio Bt/At follows some stochastic process. As the agents
equally share the endowments, eait = At and ebit = Bt for every i and t.
Besides quantity, the quality ratio βt/αt also evolves stochastically. In this
study, At and Bt are mentioned as productivity.
Let ωt = {At, Bt, αt, βt} be the information set. The timing in period
t is: (i) at the beginning of the period, quality indices and quantity shocks
in ωt are fully observed by all agents; (ii) based upon this information set,
the agents figure out their consumption plans; (iii) and then they trade with
competitive terms in the markets.
Definition 3.2.1. A competitive equilibrium consists of the quantity and price
functions {ait (ωt) , bit (ωt) , pt (ωt)}i∈[0,1],t≥0 which satisfy the following condi-
tions in any period t:
(i) Given some information set ωt and price pt, ∀i, {ait, bit} maximize
agent i’s utility in (3.1) subject to the budget constraint in (3.2);
(ii) Given the information set ωt and the consumption plans in (i),
price pt clears the markets: ∫ 1
0
aitdi = At (3.5)∫ 1
0
bitdi = Bt. (3.6)
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As all agents are identical, ait = At and bit = Bt ∀i. After some










with the first-order derivatives
∂pt
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There are some terminological notes. First, sector 2 has a favorable
productivity shock if the ratio Bt/At is higher than that in the previous period.
Second, sector 2 has a favorable quality innovation if the ratio βt/αt becomes
higher. These notes also apply to sector 1 with respect to the ratios At/Bt
and αt/βt. Third, relative price of a sector tells how many units of the other
commodity needed to trade for one unit of this sector’s commodity. We have
the following results:
Proposition 3.2.2. Ceteris paribus,
(i) when a sector has a favorable productivity shock, its relative price
depreciates if θ < 1, and stays the same if θ = 1;
(ii) when a sector has a favorable quality innovation, its relative price
depreciates if θ < 0, remains unchanged if θ = 0, and appreciates if θ ∈ (0, 1].
Proof. These results can be directly inferred from (3.8) and (3.9).
Table 3.1 summarizes the results in Proposition 3.2.2. We clearly see
the qualitative effects of two sources of variations on the equilibrium relative
price. It is interesting to note that when 0 < θ < 1, a favorable productivity
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Table 3.1: Partial effects of different variations on relative price
θ < 0 θ = 0 0 < θ < 1 θ = 1
favorable productivity shock − − − 0
favorable quality innovation − 0 + +
shock and a favorable quality innovation have opposite effects on relative price.
The following discussions will provide more intuition behind these results.
Partial Effects of Productivity Shock. When θ < 1 or the utility
function is strictly concave, an increase in the relative endowment of either
commodity will eventually push down the marginal utility of that commodity
relative to the other’s, and hence the relative price decreases. When θ = 1 or
the commodities are linearly substitutable, marginal utility is constant given
some quality indices, and relative price is not affected by productivity shock.
Generally, relative productivity and relative price have a negative correlation.
Partial Effects of Quality Innovation. When θ < 0, an increase in
relative quality of either commodity will push down the relative price of that
commodity, given some endowments. Interestingly, this result seems counter-
intuitive at the face value. To see why the result is true, note that this is
the case where products are hard to be substituted, which means the utility
function is quite concave with respect to quantity and quality (Figure B.1).
Thus, an increase in quality may shift up the utility function faster at low
quantity than at high quantity, reducing marginal utility at each quantity
level. The opposite effects apply for θ > 0 (Figure B.2). That is an increase
in quality may shift up the utility function faster at high quantity than at low
quantity, increasing marginal utility at each quantity level. When θ = 0, we
have a Cobb-Douglas utility function where quality innovation does not affect
relative marginal utility.
In addition to the equilibrium relative price pt, we have the equilibrium
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It is noted for expositional simplicity, we use Sat rather than Sbt. From
(3.7) and (3.11) we see that variations in productivity shock and quality inno-
vation are manifested by both relative price and budget share. This result is
coined double manifestation. Thus, if productivity shock, relative price, and
budget share can be perfectly observed, there are two alternative ways to infer
quality innovation, i.e. either with relative price or budget share. For exam-
ple, given relative quantity and price data, we can estimate the substitution
parameter with a regression, possibly with some instruments, as follows
ln pt = λ0 + (θ − 1) ln(B/A)t + εt. (3.12)








If we have a world of two countries each endowed with one of the
commodities a and b, and free trade takes place, the equilibrium terms of trade
will also have the form in (3.7). Thus, even though the model is explicitly about
a closed economy, its essentials can be extended to international contexts.
However, those potential extensions will need many additional considerations,
which are beyond the scope of this study.
3.2.2 VAR and a Dynamic Relationship
We may see different correlation patterns between productivity shock
and quality innovation, as long as we already know both of the series, hereafter,
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(B/A)t and (β/α)t. We choose a simple VAR model to analyze the dynamic
relationship between them. It is noted that the VAR model is not used to
separate quality innovation. It is used to generate some moments of interest.
We are developing a simple procedure to learn about variance, persis-
tence, causation, and correlation of productivity shock and quality innovation,
which are assumed to follow a lag-1 VAR model. The quantity process is char-
acterized by mean µp and standard deviation (STD) σp. The quality process
has mean µq and STD σq. Quantity and quality have a correlation coefficient
of ϕ and a corresponding covariance of σpq = (σpσq)ϕ. We construct two new
random variables as deviation from mean
Pt = (B/A)t − µp (3.14)
Qt = (β/α)t − µq. (3.15)
By construction, var(Pt) = σ
2
p, mean(Pt) = 0, var(Qt) = σ
2
q , mean(Qt)































For the sake of simulations, we need to specify Σ based upon charac-



























Equations (3.18) and (3.19) convert the original parameters into error








the VAR coefficients are further restricted so that the computed variances in
(3.16) be non-negative and |γpq| /(γpγq) ≤ 1.
By looking at the structure specified in (3.16) and (3.17), we know
which of the two processes are more volatile and more persistent. In addi-
tion, we know their correlation and causation relationships. First, it is noted
that the VAR structure nests the independence case. Thus we can test to see
if the two processes are independent or not. If correlation of the errors and
off-diagonal coefficients in the VAR model are statistically small, productiv-
ity shock and quality innovation can be considered independent. The test of
correlation between the VAR errors is not straightforward because we do not
know the variances of the estimated variance-covariance matrix Σ̂. It is noted
that estimation of the VAR structure brings about unbiased estimates of the
VAR coefficients and Σ. Thus we can employ the unbiasedness to simulate
many samples and come up with different estimates of Σ and calculate vari-
ances of Σ̂. Second, the test of causation between quantity and quality can be
simply implemented with t-tests on the off-diagonal VAR coefficients.
3.3 From Ideology to Data
In the basic model, it is straightforward to calculate the quality index.
Potentially, there is a mismatch to some extent between the basic model, which
is an ideology, and data for two major reasons. First, actual economic contexts
do not satisfy all the underlying assumptions of the basic model. Second,
observations of relative price, productivity shock, and budget shares are not
perfect. Productivity shock and relative price may be imperfectly observed
for many reasons, e.g. under-reporting and aggregating over heterogenous
and evolving types of commodities. In this section, we discuss what economic
contexts the model can be applied to, and consider several ways to deal with
imperfect observability and infer quality innovation.
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3.3.1 A Valid Data Set
For an empirical implementation of the basic model, an actual economic
context or a data set should possess three critical properties as follows.
Relative Completion. First, the sample should reflect a relatively
closed system. To put it differently, variations in relative quantity and price
should not be largely influenced by supply and demand outside the economy. If
relative completion is violated, relative prices do not bear reliable information
on the system’s fundamentals, i.e. productivity shock and quality innovation.
Full Equilibrium. Second, variations in nominal prices should fully
reflect changes in productivity shock and quality innovation. In equation (3.7),
we see that, relative price, which will be constructed based upon nominal
prices, has to adjust to clear commodities markets in equilibrium. If nominal
prices are not free to move, relative price does not provide good information on
variations deep in the economic system. This also implies that we should not
look at high frequency data which potentially have short-run deviations from
the fundamentals due to many reasons, e.g. nominal rigidities, unbalanced
monetary effects, and speculations. Besides the price-adjustment concern,
frequency of data should be low enough for full response of commodity supply
and delivery. In other words, data should reflect a system in equilibrium rather
than on-going adjustment.
CES Compatibility. Third, the estimated substitution parameter θ̂
should lie in the interval (−∞, 1] to be consistent with the CES specification.
Recall that θ̂ is the estimator in a regression, possibly an IV regression, with
relative price as the dependent and relative quantity as the independent. If
relative quantity and relative price move in opposite directions, θ̂ is highly
likely negative and readily valid. If relative quantity and relative price have
positive correlation, the latter should not be too volatile in comparison with
the former so that θ̂ is smaller than unity. In other words, the CES specification
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is not compatible with too volatile relative price which is positively correlated
with productivity shock.
3.3.2 Matching only with Relative Price
There are several ways to utilize the double manifestation result. One
is to retrieve quality innovation only from relative price according to (3.13),
and check how well the model budget share matches with its data counterpart.
When applying the basic model to real economic contexts, the inferred quality
series may not be totally consistent with the observed budget share. Here
are some possible reasons for this potential inconsistency. First, in empirical
analyses, the normalized and indexed world only maintains the true growth
rates of relative quantity and relative price rather than their true levels. This
implies that the computed budget share as defined in (3.11) does not necessar-
ily match with data counterparts. All we can check is the correlation between
them. Second, as mentioned earlier, productivity shock and quality innovation
are not perfectly observed. Third, the basic model does not have investment.
In reality, this is not the case. Among the three problems mentioned, we will
tackle the first and second in the next sections.
Alternatively, we can use budget share data to infer quality and check
the result with relative price data. For this, the starting point is (3.11).
3.3.3 Double Manifestation and Rescaling
In reality, we often observe productivity shock and relative price as
indices. The double manifestation will help us rescale these indices to make
model budget share close to its data counterpart. Explicitly, let u and s be the
correct rescaling constants. We observe index (B/A)t for productivity shock
and the true productivity shock is (B/A)t u. By the same token, we observe

















































In equation (3.21), it can be seen that the product us can be estimated.
However, u and s cannot be individually identified. That also means that we
can only infer quality innovation correct up to some unknown scale u, which
is used for rescaling productivity shock.
Specifically, the product us is chosen to minimize the squared differ-
ences between the model and data budget shares for commodity a as















































Next, we rescale pt with us and estimate θ with an IV estimation.











Note that estimates for θ are the same for original and rescaled data.
Thus, with this rescaling scheme, double manifestation is satisfied by the model
to some extent. If we have good level data for relative quantity or relative price,
u can be calculated and relative quality will be rescaled to the true level.
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3.3.4 Allowing for Measurement Errors
In the previous section we see that rescaling helps match with the data
budget share for a to some extent. In this section, we still use this rescaling
scheme and add the unknown factors (u1t, u2t) as in (3.25) and (3.26). Expres-
sion (3.25) comes from (3.20), and equation (3.26) is derived from (3.21). For
expositional simplicity, we look at the modified budget share rather than the
original one. The motivation for these errors is that there are measurement er-
rors in productivity shock, relative price, and budget share. In addition, these
are perfectly observed by the agents and not by econometricians. With a mul-





























Without multiplicative constants, we do not impose that E (u1t) =
E (u2t) = 1. However, (u1t, u2t) is assumed to have a finite variance-covariance
matrix. It is noted that the scale us is a function of observables as in (3.23)
and θ can be estimated by an IV estimation according to (3.12).
Given a static world where there are no intertemporal choices, we choose
[(β/α)t u]




























































var (ũ1t) = σ
2
1, var (ũ2t) = σ
2
2, covar (ũ1t, ũ2t) = σ12,
Det (Ω) = σ21σ
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Let qt be the true relative quality index in period t and let Φ (ũ1t, ũ2t; qt)
be the estimator in (3.29). The estimator of relative quality index has the
following conditional expectation and variance






var (Φ (ũ1t, ũ2t; qt) |qt) = ∆Φ (µ̃1, µ̃2; qt)′ Ω∆Φ (µ̃1, µ̃2; qt) , (3.31)
where µ̃1 = E (ũ1t), µ̃2 = E (ũ2t), and (Φ,ΦUt,ΦLt) are defined in (B.14)
(Appendix B.3). The complex term E{[ΦUt/ΦLt]}1/θ in (3.30) is called the
correction factor whose sample counterpart is defined in (B.17). If the sample
correction factor is significantly different from unit, the point estimator and
variance in (3.29) and (3.31) should be adjusted accordingly.
There are two important notes. First, we do not know Ω at the start.
For this reason, the implementation procedure has two steps. In the first step,
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Ω1 is the identity matrix. In the second step, Ω2 is established based upon
the estimated errors {̂̃u1t, ̂̃u2t}Tt=1 from the first step (Appendix B.3). In imple-
mentation, we can actually repeat the steps until the estimated Ω converges,
given a small tolerance level. Second, in the inference procedure, we use two
pieces of information to pin down relative quality. This may lead to overi-
dentification. The overidentification test is carried out based on the standard
J-statistic which is Chi-squared distributed with one degree of freedom.

































As (û1t, û2t) capture the differences between model outcomes and data
counterparts, we define two goodness-of-fit measures


















By construction RRPR and RBSA generally live in [0, 1] and tell how much
variation in relative price and budget share is explained by productivity shock
and quality innovation. In addition, the quantitative role that measurement
errors play in a specific context is captured by (1−RRPR) and (1−RBSA).
3.4 US Services vs. Goods in 1946-2006
In this section, we look at relative productivity shock and quality inno-
vation between two US broad product groups: services and goods, respectively
commodities b and a in the theoretical model. The annual data set, which is
drawn from the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA), covers the
period 1946-2006 (Appendix B.4).
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3.4.1 Data Description
The data set is valid for the basic model because it satisfies the three
critical conditions. First, we can treat the US economy as being relatively
closed. Net exports play a small part in total GDP, i.e. 3.2 percent in 1946,
−5.8 percent in 2006, and −0.7 percent on average in 1946-2006 (Table B.1).
Second, annual data is expected to allow full adjustments in most real activ-
ities and nominal prices. Third, we will see that the estimated substitution
parameter θ̂ ≤ 1, satisfying the CES specification.
Table 3.2: Variables in US data set
Description Definition
Goods quantity index QG
Goods price index PG
Services quantity index QS
Services price index PS
Budget share for goods* BSG
US population index* POP
Services-goods relative quantity* SGP = QS/QG
Services-goods relative price* RPR = PS/PG
Note: (*) unit root at 5%; see Appendix B.4 for more details.
Here are some important details on the construction and use of the
variables (Table 3.2). First, quantity and price indices are constructed with
a Fisher’s formula, which uses weights from two adjacent years (Appendix
B.4). In addition, quantity variables include final sales of domestic product
and changes in inventories, and exclude imports. It is noted that we exclude
structures in all considerations because they have service flows for an extended
period of time, which is hard to be picked up by a static model (Appendix
B.4). Second, the budget share for goods is calculated based on private con-
sumption data, which does not include investment, and covers imported goods
and services for consumption. It is noted that there is currently no reliable
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information to separate domestic and imported products in private consump-
tion. As mentioned earlier, we can treat the US economy as relatively closed.
Third, US population will be used as the instrumental variable in the esti-
mation of θ. Relative quantity is expected to bear some information about
total population. In the mean time, we do not expect a relationship between
relative quality and population. Later in the implementation, we will check if
total population is a valid instrument.
Figure 3.1: US data set 1946-2006, year 2000 = 1
Source: constructed from NIPA (BEA).
Time series of relative quantity, relative price, and budget share for
goods in 1946-2006 are presented in Figure 3.1. It can be observed that budget
share for goods is decreasing over time. In addition, while relative quantity
of services is fluctuating, the relative price has an increasing trend. This
latter observation suggests quality innovation may have some effects on the
relationship between relative price and productivity shock.
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3.4.2 Quality Information in Data
We have some further notes about the quality information and other
noisy information possibly borne by price and budget share data.
First, the current statistical system measures a value index as the prod-
uct of price and quantity indices, e.g. US BEA’s method in (B.18). Let a be
physical quantity associated with physical price p. Let αa be efficiency quan-
tity associated with efficiency price p̂. We observe that the value index can
be interpreted in different ways, i.e. p.a = p̂.αa. Thus, if we deflate the value
index by some price deflator, physical or efficiency, we will have the corre-
sponding quantity index. Conceptually, our quality inference methods rely on
the physical price p because it has the quality content. The question is what
price data do we currently have, physical price or efficiency price? The answer
is a mixture of the two which is closer to physical price. In other words, price
data bear information about quality changes to a large extent. It is noted that,
the extent to which prices reflect quality is not fixed. There is a gradual evolu-
tion from p to p̂ by the moves of different US statistical agencies, especially the
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) whose consumer and producer price indices
are used by the others. Before 1998, there were quality adjustments to some
products like motor vehicles and apparels by the BLS. The Boskin Commis-
sion of 1996 reported that price indices are biased upward for not adjusting
quality changes. Since 1998, the BLS has used hedonic price regressions more
extensively to adjust quality changes in prices. The extent to which prices are
adjusted for quality changes is far from complete. Landefeld & Grimm (2000)
estimate that, by 2000, 18 percent of US final expenditure is deflated by he-
donic prices. Thus the price and quantity data used in the current research
are not conceptually perfect as the physical price and quantity, especially after
1998. However, as price data still bear much quality information, the quality
inference exercise is valid.
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Second, price data do not differentiate between quality improvement
and variety growth. Quality improvement means consumers have higher util-
ity from the same quantities of some fixed products. Variety growth means
changes in the number of varieties while quality for each variety is constant.
Theoretically, variety growth can be equivalently represented by quality im-
provement, e.g. total utility
∫ θ
0
u (x) di can be replaced by single utility θu (x).
Consequently, though explicitly about quality improvement, the basic model
can also capture the effects of variety growth if price data bear these effects.
In fact, the current statistical practice tends to support this. To see why, we
look at an example of two cars of the same model. If they have the same color,
each can be sold for ten thousand dollars. If they have different colors which
are appreciated by consumers, each can claim eleven thousand dollars. In the
second case, though the total quantity is the same, the average price is higher.
In practice, the two car variants are recorded in the same category and the
average price should bear information on variety growth.
Third, with annual data, we conjecture that the ratio between services
and goods prices is not much biased by unbalanced monetary effects. Inves-
tigating a large sample in the US consumption price data for 1995-1997, Bils
& Klenow (2004) show that it takes a median period of less than six months
for prices to change. In addition, the relative frequency of price changes in all
goods and services are 26 percent. Specifically, the relative frequencies of price
changes for durable goods, nondurable goods, and services are respectively 30,
30, and 21 percent. Even though, the degree of nominal rigidity is not the same
for all products, the probability that some price will change after one year is
very large. That is, our data frequency is low enough for services and goods
prices to bear equivalent monetary effects, and the relative price and budget
share mostly capture relative productivity shock and quality innovation.
Fourth, we do not explicitly control production cost. However, produc-
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tion cost is linked to productivity and hence can be summarized by productiv-
ity shock. Thus, the basic model already somehow separates the cost effects
on relative price and budget share.
Fifth, we currently do not have information on sales tax to refine price
data. However, the tax information remaining in price data may be relatively
harmless for several reasons: (i) we are interested in the ratio of two aggregate
prices rather than individual price indices; (ii) at the aggregate level, the
relative tax rates should be stable for two adjacent years; and moreover (iii)
each link, i.e. year-to-year, in the Fisher price index series is not affected by
a link far away from that. In other words, effective tax rates do not change
much between two adjacent years, and the time series of services-goods relative
price should bear noisy tax information only to a small extent relative to
productivity and quality effects.
3.4.3 Services Relative Quality and Parameters
The implementation has three steps: (i) estimating the substitution
parameter θ; (ii) inferring the quality index; and (iii) analyzing the dynamic
relationship between productivity shock and quality innovation.
There are some notes about validity of the estimates. First, to check
the validity of the instrument estimation following (3.12), we look at the cor-
relation between relative quality and population growth. The correlation is
weak at 4 percent. Meanwhile, productivity shock and population index time
series are correlated at −43 percent. That means the estimate of θ is reliable.
Second, the sample correction factor is found to be unit, i.e. the estimator is
unbiased. Third, the J-test rejects the hypothesis of overidentification.
The point estimate for θ is −10, which means a substitution elasticity
σ of 0.09 (simple OLS estimate for θ is −2.2, for σ is 0.3). That is goods
and services are generally hard to substitute each other. Next, we calculate
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Figure 3.2: Services-goods relative quality 1946-2006
Note: estimation is based on (3.29) and (3.31).
the quality innovation time series with three methods: (i) matching only with
relative price; (ii) rescaling relative price; (iii) and allowing for measurement
errors as discussed in Section 3.3. The series generated by three methods have
very high correlation. The striking result is that relative quality time series
following method 2 and method 3 are very close. That means measurement
errors play a small role in this specific case. The point estimate and ±3STD
band for services-goods quality index according to method 3 are presented in
Figure 3.2. It can be seen that services relative quality was decreasing until
early 1970s when it started increasing.
In overall, observed productivity shock and inferred quality innovation
help largely explain variations in services-goods relative price and budget share
for goods. In fact the measures for goodness of fit are very high, i.e. RRPR =
0.96 and RBSA = 0.97. Figures 3.3 and 3.4 (below) show that the actual and
fitted variables are very close to each other.
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Figure 3.3: Actual and fitted relative prices 1946-2006
Note: fitted RPR in (3.32).
Figure 3.4: Actual and fitted budget shares for goods 1946-2006
Note: method 1 in (3.13); method 2 in (3.21); method 3 in (3.33).
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Table 3.3: US services-goods: estimation results
Description Definition Estimate STD
CES specification
substitution parameter θ −10.087 1.238
elasticity of substitution σ = 1
1−θ 0.090
quantity and quality series
productivity shock: mean & STD µp & σp 1.183 0.098
productivity shock: variation σp/µp 0.083
quality innovation: mean & STD µq & σq 0.859 0.071
quality innovation: variation σq/µq 0.082
correlation coefficient ϕ −0.917
covariance σpq = (σpσq)ϕ −0.006
VAR coefficients
quantity on quantity λpp 1.208 0.145
quality on quantity λqp 0.425 0.200
quantity on quality λpq −0.182 0.115
quality on quality λqq 0.650 0.158
Σ specification
variance of quantity error γ2p 0.0020 1.5e− 4
variance of quality error γ2q 0.0013 1.3e− 6










Given both productivity shock and quality innovation time series, we
now analyze them by the VAR model discussed earlier. Estimates of the VAR
structure are presented in Table 3.3. From the results, we have several obser-
vations as follows. First, quality innovation is as volatile as productivity shock
(σq/µq ≈ σp/µp). Second, productivity shock is more persistent than quality
innovation (λpp > λqq). Even though productivity shock is not stationary,
we still use it level time series to generate the moments of interest. Third,
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quality innovation has positive effect on productivity shock while the latter
has relatively small negative impact on the former (VAR coefficients). Fourth,
productivity shock and quality innovation have negative correlation, which
partly comes from large negative correlation between two technical seeds, i.e.
error correlation is at −99 percent. This strong result suggests that there is
an endogenous trade-off between productivity shock and quality innovation.
Fifth, quantity error is more volatile than quality error. Sixth, relative price
is correlated with productivity shock at −0.63 and with quality innovation at
0.28 percent. As negatively correlated, productivity shock and quality inno-
vation weaken each other, leading to a less volatile relative price.
3.4.4 With and without Quality Innovation
To clearly see the role of quality innovation, we carry out two counter-
factual analyses, one is on relative price and the other on relative quantity.
First is a counterfactual analysis on the relative price, in which quality
index is kept constant and productivity shock alone drives the relative price.
Figure 3.5 shows that productivity shock alone can produce the upward sloping
in relative price to some extent. However productivity shock poorly projects
the smoothness in relative price. This counterfactual result suggests that if we
ignore quality innovation and try to reproduce some relative price, the result
can be an estimated quantity series with different properties than reality.
Second is a contrast between physical and efficiency quantities. Figure
3.6 shows that while physical quantity has a lot of variations, efficiency quan-
tity is much smoother and has a negative trend. Again, this result puts forth
a warning on empirical studies: we need the consistency between the objects
in consumption, production, and the data counterparts in terms of quality
nature. Conditional on questions of interest, an inconsistency between model
and data objects may lead to misleading results.
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Figure 3.5: Actual and counterfactual relative prices 1946-2006
Note: quality index in (3.32) is kept constant at 0.944.
Figure 3.6: Physical and efficiency quantities 1946-2006
Note: efficiency quantity equals physical quantity times quality.
66
3.5 Conclusion
The current study develops a model which accounts for variations in
both relative quantity and quality between sectors, and potentially between
countries. In the model, relative productivity shock and quality innovation are
manifested in both relative price and budget share, i.e. double manifestation.
In addition, partial effects of productivity shock and quality innovation on
relative price and budget share depend on the substitution parameter. The
double manifestation result helps separate the unobserved relative quality in-
novation. Given time series of productivity shock and quality innovation, we
can investigate their individual and joint characteristics, i.e. variance, persis-
tency, causation, and correlation.
We then apply the separation method to the services and goods sectors
of the US from 1946-2006. The result shows that observed productivity shock
and inferred quality innovation explain variations in the relative price and bud-
get share very well. In addition, productivity shock alone fails to explain the
smoothness in services-goods relative price. In this specific case, productivity
shock and quality innovation are negatively correlated. Essentially, this is a
specific case which supports the quality innovation hypothesis, i.e. aggregate
quality does change over time.
The theoretical and empirical results put forth a warning that growth
and business-cycle models should not ignore quality innovation at the start.
Specifically, the missing of quality innovation may be relatively harmless in a
certain set of growth and business-cycle models. However, by not explicitly
modeling quality innovation, models with an emphasis on relative prices may
generate misleading results. In a certain context, we need to evaluate the
relative importance of quality innovation before simplifying the working model.
Klenow (2003) suggests that “...the BLS begin tabulating the difference
between inflation in average unit prices and inflation in the CPI. This gap
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reflects BLS quality adjustments...” Our study supports this suggestion. More
specifically, we should keep both price measures, one for physical price (p),
and the other for efficiency price (p̂ = p/α). In statistical practice, we are now
moving from measuring p towards measuring p̂. Efficiency price p̂ is directly
useful for welfare calculations. However, if we do not keep physical price p, we
loose the ability to separate quantity and quality. Moreover, if quantity and
quality are lumped into one measure, we will have another model of the world.
That means we may have some policy descriptions which do not deal with
the differences between quantity production and quality innovation, possibly
leading to non-optimal outcomes. The next chapter is a case where there are





This study considers a fixed set of two products whose quality varies
in response to changes in productivity (productivity-driven quality or quality
innovation for short) in the context of competitive growth and business-cycle
models. We then fit the growth model to US data to pin down some key
parameters and generate a time path of relative quality (services versus goods).
At disaggregate levels, we can actually observe quality changes, e.g.
better cars or new bank services coming out each year. However, at differ-
ent aggregate levels, quality changes are not directly observable. Chapter 3
proposes a simple method which relies on relative prices and budget shares
to infer relative quality changes. In that study, we treat relative quantity
and quality as exogenous variations. Applying the inference method to the
goods and services sectors of the US from 1946-2006, we see that quantity
and quality of services (relative to goods) are negatively correlated, suggesting
an endogenous link between productivity (which drives quantity) and quality.
The current study makes progress by explicitly modeling this link.
We address two questions. First, how does productivity affect quality?
Second, in the United States, how important is productivity-driven quality in
total quality, where the latter varies due to all possible sources like randomly
developed ideas for quality improvement as well as productivity? Answers to
these questions are interesting because this is an area that we know little about.
In addition, the answers are potentially important for policies related to factor
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markets, e.g. labor and capital income taxes. That is how policies will affect
allocation of resources between quantity production and quality innovation.
In this model, labor is used for both quantity production and quality
innovation. As quantity and quality can be substitutable in consumption, a
productivity change induces a reallocation of labor between different activities,
leading to quality variation. Productivity-driven quality is a reality rather
than just a hypothesis. For example, teachers can impose limits on class
sizes to improve teaching quality. Researchers may refrain from carrying out
simultaneously too many projects to work more on each project. Thus, a
productivity change may eventually vary output quality. There is a potential
problem in fitting the model to price and budget data because money stock and
velocity are not fixed. To overcome this difficulty, we divide the economy into
two sectors and define objects in relative terms, i.e. services versus goods. This
modeling choice helps enrich theoretical examinations and apply the model to
available aggregate data.
Here are the major findings. First, via both analytical and compu-
tational approaches, we find that (relative) productivity’s effect on (relative)
quality depends on two key parameters, which govern how substitutable the
products are (substitution parameter) and how easy it is to improve quality
(innovation parameter). Specifically, productivity and quality have a nega-
tive correlation for low-range substitutability and a positive correlation for
medium-range substitutability, where the upper bound of the medium range
negatively depends on the innovation parameter. Second, we extend the model
so that aggregate quality plays a role in quantity production to see if the stan-
dard growth accounting method remains valid. The results show no big differ-
ences between the baseline and extended models. The reason is that individual
quality indices move in opposite directions, keeping aggregate quality stable.
This implies that the baseline model is rich enough for empirical application.
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Third, when applying the baseline model to the US services-goods economy
from 1970-2006, we see that productivity-driven quality can play as much as
one half in total quality. For comparisons, we apply the method in Chapter 3
to infer total quality. The significance of productivity-driven quality calls for
more policy attentions at this type of quality responses. For example, it may
be easier and cheaper to raise social welfare by shifting some resources from
quantity production to quality innovation by means of taxation in an existing
environment with sub-optimal allocations. Fourth, via moment matching, we
pin down the key parameters for the US. The parameter estimates imply a
negative correlation between relative productivity and quality of services.
Essentially, quality innovation serves as a propagation mechanism of
productivity changes in growth and real business-cycle (RBC) models. In the
vast literature on growth and real business cycles, productivity changes are
used to explain variations in quantity and variety, e.g. Kydland & Prescott
(1982) and Chatterjee & Cooper (1993), respectively. As far as we know,
our model is among the first to explore the third branch which examines how
productivity affects quality.
There are two lines of literature that embrace two dimensions of quality
changes. One is the “quality ladder” literature in which varieties are fixed while
quality of products is evolving with a constant step in any period. The other
is the “variety growth” literature in which quality of a single product is fixed
and the number of products is changing. Two good examples of these lines
are Grossman & Helpman (1991) and Aghion & Howitt (1992), respectively.
In addition, there are papers that attempt to combine these two literatures.
In the current study, we fix the number of products and allow quality to be
endogenously determined. We deviate from the “quality ladder” literature in
two aspects: (i) markets are perfectly rather than imperfectly competitive; and
(ii) quality level and innovation steps are continuous in the sense of “quality
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escalator” (Chapter 2). We choose “quality escalator” over “quality ladder”
and “variety growth” for several reasons. First, “quality escalator” allows for
continuous quality ratios, richer sets of innovation decisions, and a better fit
in empirical applications than “quality ladder”. Second, “variety growth” can
be equivalently represented by “quality escalator”. For example, total utility∫ θ
0
u(x)di can be replaced by single utility θu(x). With the statistical practice,
though not perfect, that separates quantity growth from price changes and
condenses the large product space into a small discrete set, “quality escalator”
is more favored than “variety growth”.
It is also worthwhile discussing the difference between taste shock and
quality change. Taste shock is a random change in valuation of the same
products. Quality change is a variation in the nature of the product, either
endogenous or exogenous, that alters agents’ valuation. At the aggregate level
and with low frequency data, it is hard to interpret taste shock as a synchro-
nized event happening to all agents. Meanwhile, aggregate quality change can
be automatically achieved via competition and imitation. We assume that a
time length of one year is enough for sectoral quality synchronization.
The remaining of the study is structured as follows. Section 4.2 sets
up the model. Section 4.3 characterizes the relationship between productivity
and quality. Section 4.4 applies the model to the US economy. Finally, Section
4.5 concludes with some remarks.
4.2 An Economy of Two Sectors
In this section, we look at primitives of the environment, a competitive
equilibrium notion, and an extension of the baseline model.
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4.2.1 Baseline Preference and Technology
The economy has one representative consumer and two competitive
commodity sectors. Sectors 1 and 2 produce perfectly divisible products a
and b, respectively. The consumer is endowed with one unit of labor which is
perfectly mobile between the sectors. The numeraire is good a at time zero,




λtu (at, bt;αt, βt) , 0 < λ < 1 (4.1)











where σ > 0 and θ ≤ 1 are correspondingly for intertemporal and contem-
porary substitution. With θ as the substitution parameter, the elasticity of
substitution is −1/(1 − θ). As θ ranges from −∞ to 1, absolute value of the
elasticity of substitution ranges from 0 to ∞. The degree of substitution is
greater than unit if θ ∈ (0, 1] and smaller than unit if θ < 0.
The representative agent faces budget, labor, capital, and technology
constraints, ∀t ≥ 0, as follows
pat (at + xat) + pbt (bt + xbt) = wt (lat + lbt) + rt (kat + kbt) (4.3)
lat + lbt + nat + nbt = 1 (4.4)
kat + kbt = kt (4.5)
kt+1 = (1− δ) kt + φxνatx1−νbt (4.6)
αt = (1− ηα)αt−1 + (nat)ξ , 0 < ηα < 1 (4.7)
βt = (1− ηβ) βt−1 + (nbt)ξ , 0 < ηβ < 1, (4.8)
where positive (at, bt) and positive (αt, βt) denote quantity and quality, re-
spectively; (xat, xbt) are nonnegative investments towards the aggregate capital
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stock kt+1; (kat, kbt) are capital services from the current stock kt; (lat, lbt) are
labor used for quantity production, while (nat, nbt) are for quality innovation;
wt is the wage rate for (lat, lbt); rt is the capital rental rate; ν ∈ (0, 1) is the
contribution factor ; φ > 0 is the scale factor ; δ is the capital depreciation
rate; and ξ ∈ (0, 1) is the innovation parameter. Note that, under perfect
competition, profits will be zero and play no part in the budget constraint.
Thus, besides two consumption products, there is one investment good
used only for production. The law of motion for aggregate capital stock in
(4.6) has the mixing feature used by, for example, Kehoe & Ruhl (2005). In
addition, the agent uses “home production” to acquire know-how for improving
product quality. Specifically, quality indices of a and b respectively have the
laws of motion in (4.7) and (4.8). “Home production” simply means that it
is the agent rather than firms who accumulates know-how which will then
be transferred into product quality. For example, a teacher can revise some
syllabus at his or her own will, either at home or at school.
On the quantity production side, each sector is represented by a com-










bt , 0 < γ < 1, (4.10)
where (Kat, Kbt) and (Lat, Lbt) are demanded capital and labor, respectively;
and strictly positive (At, Bt) are sectoral total factor productivity (TFP) which
may follow some deterministic or stochastic processes, and have a common
aggregate variation component. In our model, productivity (At, Bt) is the sole
and ultimate exogenous source of variations.
Before explicitly laying out the timing of the economy, we have sev-
eral notes. First, the effective consumption quantity is a product of physical
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quantity and quality index, neither of which can be zero. Second, the repre-
sentative agent will not use all of labor endowment for quantity production,
because he or she also wants to spend some time on quality innovation. If the
agent does not spend any time on innovation, product quality depreciates as
the result of forgetfulness. Third, for simplicity, we rule out the possibility of
reversing investment good into consumption products. Fourth, capital services
are purely quantitative, e.g. number of machines. Fifth, sectoral productivity
only has direct effects on quantity production.
Figure 4.1: Timing of the economy
Let ωt = {αt−1, βt−1, kt, At, Bt} be the information set at the beginning
of period t, where (αt−1, βt−1) denote quality of the products produced at time
t − 1; kt is the capital stock; and (At, Bt) are sectoral productivity shocks.
Timing of the economy in period t ≥ 0 is as follows (Figure 4.1). First,
information set ωt is observed. Second, the representative agent decides on
factor uses {(lat, lbt); (nat, nbt); (kat, kbt)}. Third, the representative firms pro-
duce their output quantities (Yat, Ybt) with new quality levels (αt, βt) supplied
by the agent. Fourth, given the factor incomes and quality levels, the repre-
sentative agent decides on how much to consume and invest {(at, bt); (xat, xbt)}
to maximize the continuing expected life-time utility. This sequence makes it
clear that the agent may want to spend some efforts on quality innovation. In
essence, all the actions can happen simultaneously at point t.
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4.2.2 A Perfectly Competitive Equilibrium
Besides primitives in preference and technology, we need rules for the
interactions on markets: a perfectly competitive equilibrium. Before defining
the equilibrium, we formalize the utility and profit maximization problems.
Let the extended information set in period t be ω̂t = ωt∪{(αt, βt)}; and
C1t = {(lat, lbt); (nat, nbt); (kat, kbt)}, C2t = {(at, bt); (xat, xbt)} be the decisions.
The representative agent maximizes the life-time expected utility following the
dynamic programming problem
V (ωt) = max
C1t,C2t
{u (at, bt;αt, βt) + λEω̂tV (ωt+1)} (4.11)
subject to the constraints in (4.3)-(4.5), the law of motion for the capital stock
in (4.6), and the evolution of quality indices in (4.7)-(4.8).
On the production side, the representative firms solve the static profit


















bt − wtLbt − rtKbt
}
, (4.13)
with the necessary and sufficient conditions
wt = (1− µ)
patYat
Lat










Definition 4.2.1. A perfectly competitive equilibrium of the economy is the
set of policy functions {(lat, lbt); (nat, nbt); (kat, kbt); (at, bt); (xat, xbt)}∞t=0 for the
representative agent, {(Lat, Lbt); (Kat, Kbt)}∞t=0 for the representative firms,
prices {(pat, pbt); (wt, rt)}∞t=0, and the associated value function V (ωt) such that
(i) given prices, policy functions are solutions to the dynamic program-
ming problem (4.11) and the profit maximization problems (4.12)-(4.13);
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(ii) given policy functions, prices clear all markets
at + xat = Yat (4.16)
bt + xbt = Ybt (4.17)
Lat = lat (4.18)
Lbt = lbt (4.19)
Kat = kat (4.20)
Kbt = kbt. (4.21)
In equilibrium, the representative firms make zero profits, leaving the
utility maximization problem (4.11) valid. Thus, the definition of a perfectly
competitive equilibrium completes our baseline economy.
4.2.3 Hypothesis of Augmented Capital
In the baseline environment, quality does not have any effect on quan-
tity production. We relax this assumption in a simple extension. Let qt be the
average quality of the investment good, and qt follows the evolution
qt+1 = (1− Sq) qt + Sqανt β1−νt , Sq ∈ (0, 1) , (4.22)
where Sq is the weight for the addition of new quality mix. The hypothesis
of augmented capital says that effective capital services embed capital quality.
Specifically, the modified sectoral production functions have the forms
Yat = At (qtKat)
µ L1−µat (4.23)
Ybt = Bt (qtKbt)
γ L1−γbt . (4.24)
In reality, we do not often directly observe capital quality. However,
we can observe output quantity, capital stock, and labor. Thus, a direct
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application of the standard growth accounting method on (4.23), for example,
will generate a productivity measure of At (qt)
µ rather than of At. The question
is: how does our introduction of capital quality alter the TFP estimation in
the baseline model? The answer to this question may guide us in choosing the
right model in empirical studies, i.e. with or without capital quality.
4.3 Productivity-Quality Causation
This section is devoted to theoretical examinations, especially the cau-
sation from productivity to quality. We first characterize the baseline economy
and then deal with the augmented capital hypothesis. In the baseline economy,
the equilibrium allocation is Pareto optimal. This Pareto optimal allocation
can be implemented through a competitive equilibrium with some price system.
Thus, to solve for the perfectly competitive equilibrium, we follow a two-step
algorithm: (i) find the equilibrium allocation with a social planner problem;
and (ii) given the equilibrium allocation, derive the equilibrium prices.
Definition 4.3.1. The social planner finds the functions {C1t, C2t}∞t=0, with
C1t = {(lat, lbt); (nat, nbt); (kat, kbt)} and C2t = {(at, bt); (xat, xbt)}, as solutions
to the dynamic programming problem
V (ωt) = max
C1t,C2t
{u (at, bt;αt, βt) + λEω̂tV (ωt+1)} (4.25)
subject to the constraints
lat + lbt + nat + nbt = 1 (4.26)
kat + kbt = kt (4.27)










the law of motion for aggregate capital stock in (4.6), and evolution of product
quality in (4.7)-(4.8).
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In Definition 4.3.1, the maximization problem has a strictly concave
objective function with a convex compact constraint set. That means the social
planner solution uniquely exists. Given the optimal allocation, the equilibrium
wage and interest rates are derived from (4.14)-(4.15). In addition, we can pin
down the product price ratio for every period t based on the condition that















Necessary and sufficient conditions for the optimal decisions in Definition 4.3.1
constitute a complicated system, i.e. (C.5)-(C.14) in Appendix C.
So far, we have had the social planner solution and corresponding de-
centralized equilibrium in a representative agent model. As ξ ∈ (0, 1), the
representative agent will spend positive amounts of time on quality innovation
even though he or she does not receive compensation for accumulating know-
how from firms. In our model, the innovation incentive comes from the desire
for more utility in consumption. Starting from zero innovation efforts, the
representative agent can always do better by spending infinitesimal amount
of time because marginal gains are very large, i.e. slopes of the innovation
functions in (4.7) and (4.8) are infinite at zero.
One question arises. What happens to innovation efforts if there are
a continuum of agents, which is a reality, rather than a representative agent?
Our concern is that the agents may free ride on the efforts of one another,
and hence spend no time on quality innovation. To stop this behavior and
come back the representative agent equilibrium, we need to restrict our con-
siderations to symmetric equilibria. The argument runs as follows. First,
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there is no symmetric equilibrium in which all agents make zero innovation
efforts. The reason is, as mentioned before, the stakes at zero efforts are so
high that someone will deviate and accumulate some know-how. Second, for
well-behaved preference and technology primitives, there exists a set of gen-
eral equilibria including a symmetric one. All we need to do next is to select
this symmetric equilibrium and come back to the representative agent case.
Finally, the symmetry restriction is valid because we are currently interested
in the average behavior of the economy.
4.3.1 Comparative Statics
There are several motivations behind our study of comparative statics
in some steady state indexed by sectoral productivity (A,B). First, given
(A,B), we can analytically solve for the steady-state equilibrium including
allocations and a supporting price system which is unique up to some scale
(Appendix C.2). Second, in the steady state, we can perturb productivity to
learn about the productivity-quality causation and other equilibrium behaviors
of interest. Third, we can identify the parametric subspace which is relevant
for the steady states and later refine that for the equilibrium dynamics. In
overall, this is a good starting point for exploring our economy.
Lemma 4.3.2. Given Λ = ν(µ− 1) + (1− ν)(γ − 1) 6= 0, θ 6= 1
1+ξ
, and some
A, changes in relative productivity B/A have qualitative effects on relative
consumption, quality, price, and budget share, respectively, as follows
sign [∂ (b/a) /∂ (B/A)] = sign [(1− θξ) (θξ + θ − 1) Λ] (4.32)
sign [∂ (β/α) /∂ (B/A)] = sign [θ (θξ + θ − 1) Λ] (4.33)
sign [∂pba/∂ (B/A)] = sign [Λ] (4.34)
sign [∂Sb/∂ (B/A)] = sign [θ (θξ + θ − 1) Λ] . (4.35)
Proof. Appendix C.2.
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The restrictions in Lemma 4.3.2 deserve some explanations. First, Λ =
(µ− 1)ν + (γ − 1)(1− ν) 6= 0. Recall that (1− µ) and (1− γ), under perfect
competition, are the labor shares respectively in sector 1 and sector 2, and ν
is the contribution share in accumulating the aggregate capital stock. Thus
|Λ| is an average labor share. The restriction means that labor should play
some part in the economy. Generically, µ ∈ (0, 1), γ ∈ (0, 1), ν ∈ (0, 1),
and hence Λ ∈ (−1, 0). Second, θ 6= 1
1+ξ
, or the elasticity of substitution
−1/(1 − θ) cannot be −(1 + 1
ξ
). This condition guarantees that the quality
ratio β/α is well defined. Recall that ξ ∈ (0, 1) is the curvature in quality
evolution functions (4.7)-(4.8). In words, ξ positively governs the degree of
easiness in quality innovation, and hence plays a key role in the dynamics
of quality indices. When θ = 1
1+ξ
, quality indices are canceled out in the
system of FOCs, specifically (C.51), and become indeterminate. Besides this
restriction, generically, θ < 1, i.e. products are not linearly substitutable, and
hence θξ < 1. In addition, from (4.33) and (4.35), it is more interesting to have
θ 6= 0. Third, sectoral productivity A is fixed in Lemma 4.3.2. The reason
is that, except for ν = 0.5, the left-hand-side objects in (4.32)-(4.35) cannot
be expressed as functions of only B/A without extra A or B terms. In the
symmetry case, i.e. ν = 0.5, all those objects can be defined as closed-form
functions of relative productivity B/A.
In combination, Λ < 0, θ < 1, θ 6= 0, and θ 6= 1
1+ξ
. Conditional on ξ,
let θ < 0 be little substitutability ; θ ∈ (0, 1
1+ξ
) be medium substitutability ; and
θ ∈ ( 1
1+ξ
, 1) be large substitutability. There are some observations based on
Lemma 4.3.2 as follows (note that every object is in relative terms).
Proposition 4.3.3. Given some A, Λ < 0, θ < 1, θ 6= 0, θ 6= 1
1+ξ
, and
conditional on ξ ∈ (0, 1), in the steady states: (i) productivity affects con-
sumption positively for little-medium substitutability, and negatively for large
substitutability; (ii) productivity affects quality positively for medium substi-
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tutability, and negatively for little or large substitutability; (iii) productivity
always has negative effects on relative price; and (iv) productivity affects bud-
get share in the same way as quality. These results hold for all A if ν = 0.5.
Thus, key links in the economy qualitatively depend on the substitu-
tion parameter θ, conditional on ξ. We have some insights for the results in
Proposition 4.3.3. The initial effect of a positive productivity shock in sector
2, i.e. a surge in B, is a potential increase in supply of b. As the supply of b
increases, marginal utility of this product decreases, pressing the relative price
pba down. Part (iii) says this negative relative price effect prevails no matter
what happens next, independent of the substitution pattern. That is a surge
in B would finally make b’s marginal value decrease relatively to that of a. To
understand parts (i), (ii), and (iv) we consider three cases. For little substi-
tutability, the utility function with respect to effective consumption of either
a or b is quite concave. That means the agent wants to keep a close balance
between α×a and β× b. As quantity b increases, the agent transfer some cap-
ital from b to produce more a and uses the freed-up labor to largely improve
quality α. In this case, negative price effect dominates positive quantity effect,
making the budget share for b decrease. For medium substitutability, the agent
does not need to keep a close balance between effective consumptions of a and
b. In addition, as effective consumption is a product between quantity and
quality, the agent benefits the most by improving both quantity and quality
of largely one sector. As quantity b increases, it is optimal for the agent to
improve quality β. In this case, positive response in demand for b overwhelms
reduction in pba, leading to a larger Sb. For large substitutability, again, the
agent only needs to work mostly on one sector. As products are now very
easy to be substituted, the freed-up resources after a surge in B will be spent
mostly on quantity and quality of product a. As the agent demands more a
relative to b, and with a decrease in pba, the budget share for b decreases.
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Clearly, ξ and θ play important roles in what to produce, what to
consume, and what to improve upon. In empirical studies, these parameters
should be fitted to data. Within some ball around the steady state, we expect
that those results in (4.32)-(4.35) would hold for equilibrium dynamics.
4.3.2 Equilibrium Dynamics
With a numerical exercise, we look at equilibrium dynamics of the econ-
omy in the neighborhood of some steady state, i.e. an RBC model. For sim-
plicity, the equilibrium is approximated by linear laws of motion of endogenous
variables. The exercise will generate correlation coefficients shedding light on
the economic relations of interest. We use the parameter values in Table 4.1
for simulations. The processes governing (At, Bt) will be specified shortly.
Table 4.1: Baseline parameter values in simulations
description symbol range value
curvature of CES θ (−∞, 1] −3; 0.3; 0.7
time discount factor λ (0, 1) 0.95
curvature of CRRA σ (0,∞) 2.0
capital depreciation rate δ (0, 1) 0.05
investment contribution factor ν (0, 1) 0.45
investment scale factor φ (0,∞) 1.0
capital share in a production µ (0, 1) 0.4
capital share in b production γ (0, 1) 0.35
depreciation of α ηα (0, 1) 0.1
depreciation of β ηβ (0, 1) 0.12
quality innovation parameter ξ (0, 1) 2/3
There are reasons behind the parameter choice. First, as noted ear-
lier, conditional on ξ, the substitution parameter plays an important role in
the relations between variables. We define ξ = 2/3, which means the thresh-
old 1
1+ξ
= 0.6, and examine three specific values of θ corresponding to little,
medium, and large substitutability. Specifically, the corresponding θ values
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are −3, 0.3, and 0.7. Second, the subjective discount rate is assumed to be
5.2 percent, and the discount factor is λ = 0.95. Third, the constant rate
of risk aversion is σ = 2. In fact, σ does not play any role in comparative
statics. However, it critically governs intertemporal decisions in equilibrium
dynamics. Fourth, the capital depreciation rate is assumed to be 5 percent
per year. Fifth, it is more interesting to look at sectoral asymmetry, i.e. we
have different capital shares and quality depreciation rates for the two sectors.
Finally, for simplicity, φ = 1.























where A1 = 1; B1 = 1; and εt = [εat εbt]







Effectively, At ∼ N(1, 0.022), Bt ∼ N(1, 0.0252), and they are not correlated.
For simplicity, we do not allow At and Bt to be correlated.
As some key variables can be observed in reality, model correlation
patterns can be matched with data counterparts for clues on the range of
the parameters ξ and θ. Recall that decisions are functions of the informa-
tion set ω. We first log-linearize the system of FOCs, and then impose the
laws of motion zt = Γzt−1 + Ψst, where zt includes key endogenous variables
and st contains the exogenous productivity shocks (Appendix C.3). In the
log-linearization transformation, the variables {zt, st} are interpreted as per-
centage deviations from the nonstochastic steady state counterparts. As soon
as transformed data are simulated, we can back out the original variables and
generate correlation coefficients. The process that generates st is derived from
(4.36) and (4.37). The feedback and feedforward matrices Γ and Ψ are solved
with the method of undetermined coefficients by Christiano (2002).
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In this exercise, eigenvalues of Γ for θ = {−3, 0.3} are strictly less
than unit, keeping the dynamic systems stable. However, the dynamic system
becomes unstable for θ = 0.7. In fact, for θ ∈ (0.6, 1), the system is not stable
most of the time; and if it is stable, quality indices may have negative values.
For θ < 0.6, e.g. θ = 0.59, the system is stable (Appendix C.3). In general,
by varying ξ and θ, we see that the system is always stable for θ < 1
1+ξ
,
and it becomes chaotic most of the time for θ > 1
1+ξ
. In words, too much
substitution between products a and b does not produce stable and sensible
dynamics. With no friction in factor mobility, productivity variations may
cause too much turnover of labor and capital between product sectors.
Table 4.2: Dynamics: correlation patterns
line description θ < 0 θ ∈ (0, 1
1+ξ
)
1. B/A & Yb/Ya + +
2. B/A & b/a + +
3. B/A & β/α − +
4. B/A & pba − −
5. B/A & Sb − +
6. B/A & (lb + nb)/(la + na) − +
7. B/A & lb/la − +
8. B/A & nb/na − +
9. B/A & kb/k − +
10. Ybt/Yat & bt/at + +
11. Ybt/Yat & pbat − −
12. bt/at & pbat − −
13. βt/αt & pbat + −
Note: θ for substitution; ξ for innovation.
Thus, we further impose that θ < 1
1+ξ
for ξ ∈ (0, 1). What do we have
with this restriction? The correlation patterns turn out to be consistent with
the results in Proposition 4.3.3 (Table 4.2). First, as expected, the correlation
between B/A and pba does not depend on θ. Second, the correlation between
Yb/Ya and b/a is always positive, e.g. if relative output is higher, the cor-
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responding relative consumption also increases. In addition, Yb/Ya and b/a
have the same correlation patterns with B/A, or pba, conditional on θ. This
implies that, in empirical studies, we only need data on either Yb/Ya or b/a.
Third, the correlation between relative productivity and quality lines up with
Proposition 4.3.3. Specifically, a positive relative productivity shock decreases
relative quality for little substitutability, and the reverse holds for medium
substitutability. This is also the case in the relationship between B/A and
Sb. Fourth, for little substitutability or θ < 0, relative quality and relative
price have positive correlation. This result differs from that in Chapter 3 even
though the two models arrive at quite similar relative price functions as in
(4.30). The reason for the difference lies in the nature of the relationship
between relative quality and relative price. Chapter 3 looks at a direct re-
lationship between relative quality and relative price, in which the former is
exogenous and causes the latter. Thus, for θ < 0, relative quality and relative
price have a negative correlation. In the current study, both relative quality
and relative price are endogenously driven by the same exogenous productivity
shocks, and have positive correlation when θ is negative. In addition, the dif-
ference also happens for θ ∈ (0, 0.5). In reality, if quality has some exogenous
components which dominate the effects driven by productivity shocks, we may
again see the results in Chapter 3.
Lines 6-9 of Table 4.2 also support our predictions about how the agent
reallocate labor and capital when facing a positive shock in relative productiv-
ity B/A. For little substitutability, to keep a close balance between effective
consumptions, the agent transfers some labor and capital from sector 2 to
sector 1, reducing relative quality β/α. Note that relative output Yb/Ya still
rises for a dominant increase in B/A. For medium substitutability, there is
not much difference between the two products. Thus, an increase in B/A
stimulates a diversion of resources from sector 1 to sector 2, raising β/α.
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4.3.3 Does Capital Quality Matter?
The extended model, in which capital quality plays some role in pro-
duction functions, is presented in Appendix C.4. We examine the equilibrium
dynamics of this model. In fact, the introduction of capital quality does not re-
ally affect growth accounting because in all cases qt virtually does not change
over time. In other words, for example, the time series At and At(qt)
µ are
nearly the same after rescaling. The direct reason is that no matter how the
ratio βt/αt evolves, individual quality indices tend to move in opposite direc-
tions. e.g. when βt increases, αt decreases. The intuition is that if changing the
ratio βt/αt is one instrument for utility maximization, then moving innovation
labor between αt and βt is a direct way. As individual quality indices move
in opposite directions, aggregate quality, which is a quality mixture (4.22),
should not change much over time.
We have characterized the equilibrium dynamics in an RBC model.
How about a growth model? Our established results remain valid. We embed
considerations of a growth model in the upcoming US application.
4.4 Application to US Services-Goods Economy
Based on the previous discussion, we choose the baseline model to be
fitted to the services and goods sectors of the US economy. Sector 1 produces
goods (a), and sector 2 offers services (b). The ultimate exogenous driving
force in the economy is productivity evolution in the two sectors. The object
of our main interest is services-goods relative quality driven by productivity
changes. There are three specific tasks. First is finding the parameter values
so that the numerical model can generate certain moments in the data trends.
Second is perturbing the productivity shocks around the trends to see if the
model can mimic the patterns in data time paths and infer endogenous quality
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innovation. Third is comparing productivity-driven quality innovation with
total quality innovation, which is based on Chapter 3. Before carrying out the
tasks, we examine the data.
4.4.1 Data Description
Our US data come from the national income and product accounts
(NIPA) by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). All the data are publicly
available and can be readily downloaded from the BEA’s Web site. Postwar
data are available from 1946 to 2006. However, only the 1970-2006 data are
used. The horizon restriction is based on the fact that time series in 1970-2006
have clear trends which are useful to the upcoming moment matching exercise.
Classifications of goods and services follow the definitions of NIPA ta-
bles. The broad components of goods industries are agriculture, forestry, and
fisheries; mining; and manufacturing. The services industries are transporta-
tion and public utilities; wholesale trade; retail trade and automobile services;
finance, insurance, and real estate; different services; and government services.
We omit residential and non-residential structures because they are composed
of mixed quality levels and can render services for a very long period of time.
The original time series and their corresponding source NIPA tables
are: (i) goods quantity index Yat (1.2.3); (ii) goods price index Pat (1.2.4); (iii)
services quantity index Ybt (1.2.3); (iv) services price index Pbt (1.2.4); and
(v) budget share for services Sbt (1.5.5). Besides these key time series, there
are other data pieces which will be specified later. All the quantity and price
time series are first normalized so that their indices equal unit in the year
2000. The services-goods relative price is constructed as Pbt/Pat. Individual
prices may have a lot of noises like inflation and taxes. However, the price
ratio is supposed to largely bear relative quantity and quality information
(Chapter 3). By the same token, the budget share for services should evolve
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mostly under relative quantity and quality effects. It is noted that, reliable
measures of labor allocation in quantity production and quality innovation
are not available. This means we cannot use the standard growth accounting
exercise to estimate sectoral productivity evolutions.
Figure 4.2: US services-goods economy, 1970-2006
Source: NIPA tables (BEA).
There are some key data features. First, goods and services quantities
have upward trends with relatively stable growth rates (Figures 4.3 and 4.4).
Second, quantity of goods grows more quickly than that of services, leading
to a downward trend in the services-goods relative quantity time path (Figure
4.2). Third, the services-goods relative price and the budget share for services
are increasing over time. As predicted by the model, relative quantity and
price are always negatively correlated. The opposite trends in the services
relative quantity and budget share suggest that goods and services have little
substitutability, i.e. θ < 0, which seems intuitive for this product dichotomy.
In combination, the tasks have to rely on a limited data set. In addition,
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the economy we are trying to match is not the original one, but a normalized
version of that. This normalization may cause inconsistencies between different
objects. Next, we will discuss how to deal with these problems.
4.4.2 Parameter Values
The task is to numerically specify the baseline model. Among the
parameters, {θ, ηα, ηβ, ξ} are of our main interest because they critically govern
the (relative) quality innovation process. In the literature, many studies rely
on detrended data to estimate parameters. In this application, we do not
rely on detrended data because the relative price and budget share concepts
prevent us from doing so. In addition, we cannot apply GMM estimation
methods based on the FOC system because productivity, detailed labor and
capital uses, and quality indices are not directly observed. Our strategy is to
first specify uncritical parameters and then use moment matching to pinpoint
the four mentioned above. Parameter values are summarized in Table 4.3.
Table 4.3: Parameter values in US application
description symbol value source
curvature of CES θ −7.0 matching
time discount factor λ 0.97 assigning
curvature of CRRA σ 2.0 assigning
capital depreciation rate δ 0.06 assigning
investment contribution factor ν 0.42 assigning
investment scale factor φ 1.0 assigning
capital share in a production µ 0.32 assigning
capital share in b production γ 0.34 assigning
depreciation of α ηα 0.0045 matching
depreciation of β ηβ 0.0055 matching
quality innovation parameter ξ 0.69 matching
Using the original (normalized) data means that we need to solve the
nonstationary equilibrium of a growing economy. For this purpose, additional
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assumptions are imposed on the model and data. First, for simplicity, the
agent is assumed to have correct expectations about future productivity evo-
lution in both sectors. In the model, output growth comes exclusively from
productivity changes. Thus, for the sample horizon 1970-2006, projections of
{At, Bt} are based on the time series {Yat, Ybt}. The model is effectively de-
terministic because the distribution of future states is degenerate. Second, we
need to specify the initial and terminal conditions. The initial state composed
of total capital stock and quality indices is assumed to take on steady state
values if the 1970’s sectoral productivity levels stay forever. For the terminal
conditions, we assume that the economy goes on for 10 more years after 2006.
It is ideal to have a very long model horizon to guarantee that the termi-
nal conditions do not affect behaviors in the sample horizon. However, this
truncation of future is necessary for feasible computations and reliable projec-
tions of productivity evolutions. Technically, if the out-of-sample horizon is
too long, the two projected sectoral productivity time paths diverge so much
that numerical computations of the equilibrium are not reliable. In fact, to
compute the equilibrium, we implement the Newton’s method in C++ with
the initial guess at steady state values of each year (Appendix C.5).
Uncritical Parameters. From Proposition 4.3.3, we know that some
parameters are not important to the relative performance between the sectors.
Those uncritical in the (relative) quality innovation process are {λ,σ,δ,ν,φ,
µ,γ}. First, the time discount factor λ and capital depreciation rate δ are
rounded-off values based on the US calibration exercise by Cooley & Prescott
(1995). Second, the CRRA curvature parameter σ is often chosen to be unit
so that the utility function is logarithmic. We choose another value for this
parameter to avoid any special effects possibly linked to the logarithmic form.
Third, specification of the contribution factor is based on a derivation of the
FOC that ν = patxat/(patxat +pbtxbt). In words, ν is the share of sector 1 in in-
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vestment market value. This parameter should not be too far from the budget
share for goods in consumption, which is 0.47 on average in 1970-2006 (NIPA
1.5.5.). This numerical value is not compatible with the computation of the
equilibrium. Via experiments, we fix ν at 0.42, i.e. goods contribute a smaller
share than services in capital accumulation. This at first seems contradictory
to the common sense that services cannot be accumulated. However, it should
be borne in mind that almost all economic activities have some services con-
tents like electricity, transportation, insurance, and finance. In general, these
various services play a crucial role in production, location, purchases, and con-
sumption. Hence services are embodied in the capital stock. Fourth, again, we
assume the investment scale factor to be unit for simplicity. Fifth, in principle,
the parameters µ and γ can be specified based on income shares (NIPA 6.1).
In the data, capital shares in goods and services industries are respectively
0.28 and 0.35 in 1970-2000, which means sector 2 (services) employs relatively
more labor than sector 1 (goods). However, the difference between those two
values is large enough to spoil equilibrium computations. The economy-wide
capital share is 0.33. Based on this, we choose µ = 0.32 and γ = 0.34.
Critical Parameters. Seeking {θ, ηα, ηβ, ξ} is an interesting exercise
because they are either new in the literature or mysterious in this application.
As mentioned earlier, we rely on moment matching to pin them down, where
the objective function is the sum of squared differences between data and model
moments. Unfortunately, as the data set is limited, we do not have enough
moments to identify all of these parameters at the same time. Experiments
on the discretized parameter space show that ηα and ηβ should be small but
cannot be zero, and ηβ > ηα. We assume that ηβ = 0.0055 and ηα = 0.0045,
i.e. quality of services is easier to depreciate than quality of goods.
Here are some details about the moments. We specify the time paths of
At and Bt as smooth trends based on those of Yat and Ybt. In addition, growth
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in Bt is then scaled down by a factor of 0.98 to make the model budget share
for services close to the data counterpart in equilibrium. Effectively, we fix the
time series of Bt/At. The moments reflect responses of endogenous relative
objects to the evolution of Bt/At. The first moment is the angle between
linear trends of Ybt/Yat and Sbt. The second moment is the slope of the linear
trend in Sbt. Changes in θ and ξ do vary these moments. There is a subtle
and negligible difference between data and model moments: data moments are
based on linear projections of the original data, whereas model moments are
based on linear projections of trends in the original data.
Examinations of the objective function reveal that we do not have a
globally convex programming problem. This prevents us from using the sim-
ulated method of moments to estimate these two parameters. To overcome
this challenge, the exercise has two steps. First is finding a good guess, and
second is iteratively searching for θ and ξ. We discretize the parameter space
to have guesses of θ and ξ. In fact, the final parameters are not far from the
guesses. Specifically θ = −7.0, ξ = 0.69, and note that θ < 1/(1 + ξ). The
corresponding elasticity of substitution between goods and services is −0.125.
This means goods and services are hard to be substituted.
4.4.3 Simulated Time Paths
To pin down parameters, we rely on data trends and specify smooth
time paths of At and Bt. Here, we perturb the time series of At and Bt around
the smooth trends to mimic the evolution of actual Yat and Ybt; then generate
some time paths of interest; and compare those with data. In overall, simulated
objects match the data trends quite well (Figures 4.3-4.6). However, there are
some features in the data that the model does not mimic satisfactorily.
Here are some detailed observations. First, our projections of the pro-
ductivity time paths can generate the extent of economic growth in 1970-2006
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Figure 4.3: Services-goods relative quantity, 1970-2006
Note: simulated quantity is renormalized for comparisons.
Figure 4.4: Data and simulated goods quantity, 1970-2006
Note: data output is renormalized for comparisons.
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Figure 4.5: Data and simulated services quantity, 1970-2006
Note: data output is renormalized for comparisons.
Figure 4.6: Services-goods relative price, 1970-2006
Note: simulated price is renormalized for comparisons.
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Figure 4.7: Budget share for services, 1970-2006
data (Figures 4.4 and 4.5). In addition, the simulated evolution patterns in
output can mimic the reality. However, as the perturbations around produc-
tivity trends are small, some simulated time paths are smoother than the data
evolutions like those in Figures 4.3 and 4.4. Second, the simulated services-
goods relative price matches the data in both trend and pattern to a large
extent (Figure 4.6). This again supports the productivity projections based
on actual output time series. Third, the trend in simulated budget share for
services does match the reality (Figure 4.7). However, even though the simu-
lated and data time series have large positive correlation (0.98), their patterns
are different. Specifically, while the data time series has the sigmoid shape,
the simulated one shows a clear positive trend. In addition, the latter is less
volatile than the former.
In overall, simulated variables have the same correlation patterns pre-
sented in Table 4.2 (for little substitutability). An increase in productivity
B/A will induces a transfer of labor and capital to sector 1. Thus, relative
productivity and relative quality are negatively correlated.
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4.4.4 Endogenous vs. Total Quality Innovation
The previous comparisons show that the model can mimic the extent
of growth in observable objects. This implies we can generate a reliable trend
of services relative quality. By comparing the extent of growth in (relative)
endogenous and total quality measures, we learn about the importance of the
former as a macroeconomic response for welfare improvement. Recall that
total quality innovation is based on the quality inference method in Chapter
3, which can be interpreted as an accounting exercise. Specifically, quantity
changes alone cannot fully explain evolution of the relative price of services,
and the remaining part is caused by total quality innovation. Thus, total
quality innovation varies due to all possible sources like randomly developed
ideas for quality improvement as well as productivity variations.
Figure 4.8: Endogenous vs. total quality innovation, 1970-2006
Note: θ = −7.0; total quality innovation is based on Chapter 3; 1970’s
values are normalized to 1; we compare the trends of two time series.
In Figure 4.8, both relative quality concepts move upwards over time,
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i.e. quality of services increases in relation to that of goods. However, total
quality grows faster than endogenous quality. When comparing the trends,
from 1970-2006, endogenous quality accounts for about two fifths to one half
of total quality growth. Thus, productivity evolution and its quality responses
do play a significant role in general quality development. This also means we
can see how important other factors, which are not tied to productivity as in
the baseline model, collectively are. At the aggregate level, those other factors
including R&D can be treated as exogenous and introduced into the laws of
motion (4.7) and (4.8). We do not attempt this extension here.
4.5 Conclusion
In this study, we examine how productivity affects quality in the con-
text of competitive growth and RBC models and how important productivity-
driven quality is in total quality of the US. Differing from the variety-growth
and quality-ladder literature, this study does not use market power to explain
why quality varies. Specifically, labor is used for both quantity production and
quality innovation. As quantity and quality can be substitutable, a change in
productivity induces a reallocation of labor, leading to quality variations.
This study finds that productivity’s effect on quality depends on two
key parameters, which govern how substitutable the products are and how
easy it is to improve quality. Specifically, productivity and quality have a
negative correlation for low-range substitutability and a positive correlation for
medium-range substitutability, where the upper bound of the medium range
negatively depends on the innovation parameter. The model is then applied
to the goods and services sectors of the US from 1970-2006 using aggregate
data. The main empirical result suggests that productivity-driven quality can
play a significant role in total quality. In addition, the parameter estimates
imply a negative correlation between productivity and quality.
98
Appendix A
Derivations for Chapter 2
A.1 Expected Innovation Step Function
Given any effort λ ∈ [0, 1], the expected innovation step is sE(λ) =
λs(λ). Observe that s′E(λ) = s(λ) + λs
′(λ) > 0. Consider the second-order
derivative
s′′E(λ) = 2s
′ (λ) + λs′′ (λ)
⇐⇒ s′′E(λ) = s′ (λ) {2 + λs′′ (λ) /s′ (λ)} .
This equation suggests that we choose s(λ) = λ1−ν , where ν < 1 is the constant
rate of risk aversion. Thus, s′′E(λ) = s
′(λ)(2 − ν) > 0, and the expected step
is convex in effort.
A.2 Properties of b(θx, px)
To use the implicit function theorem, based on the common FOC, we
construct the following function: F (b, θx, px) = (θx/px)u




























(1− rR) < 0.
where rR = −(θxb/px)u′′(θxb/px)/u′(θxb/px). Note that ∂b/∂θx = −Fθ/Fb and
∂b/∂px = −Fp/Fb. Thus ∂b/∂θx > 0 and ∂b/∂px < 0. This also implies that
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∂b/∂kx = (∂b/∂θx)(∂θ/∂kx) > 0. We need these conditions hold unambigu-









The monopoly solves maxpx{b(px) (1− w/px)}. Based on Appendix
A.2, the FOC and its equivalent forms are
b′ (px) (1− w/px) + b (px)w/p2x = 0
⇐⇒ − (Fp/Fb) (1− w/px) + b (px)w/p2x = 0














Plug this result into (A.1), the optimal budget share for innovation products













A.4 Decreasing Optimal Investments
Consider the equality in equation (2.10), i.e. λx > 0. We define

















By the implicit function theorem, λ′x(kx) = −F1(kx, λx)/F2(kx, λx). Observe
that at the optimal λx, the SOC of the Bellman equation is F2 (kx, λx) < 0.
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In addition, by the envelop theorem, V M1 (kx) = Π
M
1 (kx). Next, we have
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x ) < 0. In




The Bellman equation in (2.18) can be rewritten as
V D(kx, ky) = max
λx≥0






λx(1− λy)V D(k+x , ky)+
(1− λx)λyV D(kx, k+y )+
(1− λx)(1− λy)V D(kx, ky)

 .














+(1− λy)V D(k+x , ky) + λx(1− λy)V D1 (k+x , ky)s′(λx)
−λyV D(kx, k+y )
−(1− λy)V D(kx, ky)
 ≤ 0
⇐⇒ −c′(λx) + β
 λy
{ [
V D(k+x , k
+























Finally, by the envelop theorem, the FOC becomes
− c′(λx) + β
 λy
{ [
V D(k+x , k
+






















 ≤ 0, (A.5)
where equality holds if λx > 0.
A.6 Comparisons of Social Welfare
(i) WTS: WS (kx)> W
M (kx) ∀kx. Assume that the economy starts
at kx at time t and follows some feasible policy λ
t = {λj}∞j=t. The existence
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of a threshold k∗ implies that there is a time T far into the future beyond
which both the monopoly and social planner do not innovate, i.e. λj = 0
∀j > T . This means that dynamic values are finite. Formally, dynamic values





























where ΦGM(·) and ΦGS(·) are gross welfare flows. Given that both the monopoly
and social planner follow the same λt, they will land on the same know-how
stocks in all future paths. It is already established that ΦGS(kx) > Φ
GM(kx)
∀kx. Thus W S (kx, λt) > WM (kx, λt). Further assume that λt is optimal
for the monopoly. As B is large, λt is also feasible for the social planner.
Consequently, the social planner does strictly better by just mimicking the
monopoly, and even better by carrying out the optimal policy.
(ii) WTS: λS(kx) ≥ λ
M(kx) ∀kx. Our claim readily holds in two non-
mutually exclusive: for t > T , no one innovates; and λM(kx) = 0 for some kx.
Consider all kx where λ
M(kx) > 0 and the corresponding FOC is

















If the social planner chooses λx, the marginal cost is also c



















Note that ΠM(kx) = [(1 − σ)1/σ]US(kx), which implies US1 (kx) > ΠM1 (kx)
for σ ∈ [1
2
, 1). Further, by the envelop theorem, V S1 (kx) = U
S
1 (kx) and
V M1 (kx) = Π
M
1 (kx). By integration, V
S(k+x ) − V S(kx) > V M(k+x ) − V M(kx).
Thus at λx, marginal benefit is strictly larger than marginal cost for the so-
ciety. As these functions are continuous in λx, the social planner can always
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find some ε > 0 such that marginal benefit is still larger than marginal cost at
λx + ε, thereby raising social welfare. This holds true for either decreasing or
increasing marginal benefits. In words, if the monopoly chooses some λx > 0
at some kx, the social planner will make a strictly larger effort.
(iii) WTS: WS(kx) > W
D(ω) ∀kx= max {kx,ky}. The argument fol-
lows the same line in the comparison between social planning and monopoly.
Observe that only the front-runner makes positive profit flows. Thus we
can collapse the duopoly state to be unidimensional and compare the so-
cial planner with the duopoly. First, there exists time T beyond which no
firms innovate, allowing us to truncate the far future and compare finite
sums of social welfare flows. Second, Lemma 2.3.5 already established that
ΦGS(kx) ≥ ΦGD(kx, ky) ∀kx ≥ ky. Third, by construction, the social planner
can always follow the evolution path of the duopoly in equilibrium with equal
or less R&D costs and weakly higher probabilities of success. Explicitly, let
λmax(kx, ky) = max{λ(kx, ky), λ(ky, kx)}. Given kx, the social planner chooses
λmax(kx, ky), and, in the next period, will produce at the duopoly quality level.
Thus, the social planner can follow this policy rule, which is weakly subopti-
mal, and still generates higher social welfare than under duopoly.
A.7 Nonlinear Substitution: Behavior and Welfare
Consumption Behavior. Consumers choose a budget share b given
that b is optimally distributed on the innovation products. First, given some
b and prices, consumers solve the problem
max
x,y≥0





































α + θαy y (b)
α) +B − b} .
Hence






where π = 1/(1 + ασ − α), and it can be shown that ∂b/∂θx > 0, ∂b/∂θy > 0,
which hold for σ ∈ (0, 1). Thus given {θx, θy, px, py}, where prices depend on
the allocation mechanism, we can calculate one-period utility.
Monopoly. The monopoly solves maxpx,py≥w{x(px −w) + y(py −w)},
where the demand functions are specified earlier. Let the maximized profit

















Appendix A.8 will provide more details on this pricing problem. Next, to find
the optimal R&D investments, the monopoly solves the Bellman equation
V M (ω) = max
λx,λy≥0
{
ΠM(ω)− c (λx)− c (λy) + βE(λx,λy)V M (ω′)
}
.
Based on monopoly pricing, the one-period utility function UM (ω) can be
constructed. Conditional on the state ω, the flow of social welfare is
ΦM(ω) = UM (ω) + ΠM(ω)− c (λx)− c (λy) . (A.9)
Given agents’ maximizing behaviors, discounted life-time social welfare is de-
fined recursively as
WM (ω) = ΦM(ω) + βE(λx,λy)W
M (ω′) , (A.10)
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based on which we can find the maximal and ex ante social welfare values.
Duopoly. In every period, the firms engage in a Bertrand game. Given










Firm Y solves a similar problem. The FOCs of these problems constitute a
system which pins down the equilibrium price, conditional on the quality levels
(Appendix A.8). The pricing game has an equilibrium (Caplin and Nalebuff,
1991). Observe that the maximized profit function is symmetric with respect
to X and Y . Thus if ΠD(ω) is the profit function for X, then ΠD(ω̃) is the
profit function for Y , where ω̃ is the permuted ω. Given the one-period profit
function, firm X solves the Bellman equation
V D (ω) = max
λx≥0
{
ΠD(ω)− c (λx) + βE(λx,λy)V D (ω′)
}
,
knowing that firm Y also solves a similar problem. Conditional on ω, the
FOCs of these two Bellman equations constitute a system which pins down
the equilibrium play in that state. Again, we can solve the entire R&D game by
backward induction, knowing that any firm will not invest further if already
on and beyond k∗. The solution of the problem is a symmetric MPE λ(·),
which specifies how much a firm will spend on R&D in a given state.
Given the pricing behavior of the duopoly conditional on ω, we can
construct the one-period utility function UD(ω). In combination, the flow of
social welfare is
ΦD (ω) = UD(ω) + ΠD(ω) + ΠD(ω̃)− c (λx)− c (λy) , (A.11)
where λx = λ(ω) and λy = λ(ω̃). Recursively, the discounted life-time social
welfare function is defined as
WD (ω) = ΦD (ω) + βE(λx,λy)W
D (ω′) . (A.12)
105
Based on this equation, maximal long-run and ex ante social welfare values
can be constructed.
The Social Planner. The social planner is different from the monopoly
in two main aspects: (i) prices are set at unit cost; and (ii) investments are
for consumer utility rather than profit. As prices are set at unit cost w, the
one-period utility US(ω) can be calculated according to (A.6)-(A.9). Thus the
Bellman equation is
V S (ω) = max
λx,λy≥0
{
US(ω)− c (λx)− c (λy) + βE(λx,λy)V S (ω′)
}
. (A.13)
Observe that the value function is exactly the discounted life-time social wel-
fare W S (ω). Based on this value function, we can specify the maximal and ex
ante social welfare levels.
A.8 Memoranda: Monopoly and Duopoly Pricing
Monopoly. Here are more details about the monopoly pricing prob-
lem. Numerical solutions to the pricing problem rely on the Newton’s method
































where ε = α/(α − 1), qx = px/θx, qy = py/θy, and f is the objective function.


















































































) [µ(α−1)x µ′x (py) + µ(α−1)y µ′y (py)] .











































































































b′′ (px, py) , (A.18)
where





































































y µ′′y (px, px)
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y µ′′y (py, py)
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Duopoly. Numerical solutions to the Nash pricing problem also rely on
the Newton’s method with the analytical Jacobian of the system which is built
from firms’ first-order conditions with respect to prices. Let f(px, py) = (fx fy)
′
where {fx, fy} are the first-order derivatives of X’s and Y ’s profit functions
{θxΠX , θyΠY }, respectively. Thus, a Nash equilibrium satisfies f(px, py) = 0.
We have
θxΠX (px, py) = µxb (px − w) ,
θyΠY (px, py) = µyb (py − w) ,
fx = (px − w) [µ′x (px) b+ µxb′ (px)] + µxb, (A.19)
fy = (py − w)
[












fxx = 2 [µ
′
x (px) b+ µxb
′ (px)] +
(px − w) [µ′′x (px, px) b+ 2µ′x (px) b′ (px) + µxb′′(px, px)] ,
fyy = 2
[






µ′′y (py, py) b+ 2µ
′
y (py) b






x (py) b+ µxb
′ (py)] +









µ′′y (py, px) b+ µ
′
y (py) b
′ (px) + µ
′
y (px) b




where all of the denotations are from the monopoly pricing problem.
A.9 Nonlinear Substitution: Characterizations
Figure A.1: Monopoly: investment & social welfare
(A) (B)
Note: α = 0.8. In panel A, the monopoly only innovates product x
at low know-how stocks. In panel B, the social welfare function is
increasing and concave. Given the monopoly’s innovation behavior,
the economy only progresses for a short period of time and achieves a
maximal welfare level associated with low product quality.
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Figure A.2: Duopoly: profit & social welfare
(A) (B)
Note: α = 0.8. In panel A, firm X ’s one-period profit is increasing
in its product quality and decreasing in that of the rival; Hence, X ’s
innovation incentive is greater when θy is smaller. For low θy, firm X
innovates its product all the way to k∗ and faces bouncing effects at this
threshold; For this reason, R&D efforts along this belt look bumpy; If k∗
is large enough, beyond which the slope of θ is infinitesimal, the bumpy
effects disappear. In panel B, the welfare function is also increasing and
concave.
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Figure A.3: Social planner: investment & social welfare
(A) (B)
Note: α = 0.8. In panel A, innovation investment in x is decreasing in
both kx and ky. In panel B, the planner social welfare function has




Derivations for Chapter 3
B.1 Equilibrium in the Basic Model








s.t. ait + ptbit = eait + ptebit.




αθt (eait + ptebit − ptbit)





The necessary and sufficient condition with respect to bit is
αθt (eait + ptebit − ptbit)





(ii) In equilibrium, we already have that bit = Bt. In addition, with the
equal-endowment rule, eait = At and ebit = Bt. Thus (B.1) can be written as
αθtA
θ−1















(iii) Given the equilibrium relative price in (B.2), the equilibrium bud-


















Figure B.1: Quality innovation and marginal utility, θ < 0
Figure B.2: Quality innovation and marginal utility, θ > 0
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B.2 Relations between VAR Parameters
(i) Derivation of variances of (εpt, εqt)
From (3.14) and (3.15), we have{
Pt = λppPt−1 + λqpQt−1 + εpt




var(Pt) = var(λppPt−1 + λqpQt−1 + εpt)












































(ii) Derivation of covariance of (εpt, εqt)
From (B.4) and the fact that E(Pt) = E(Qt) = 0, we have
covar (Pt, Qt) = σpq = E(PtQt)





q + (λppλqq + λpqλqp)σpq + γpq.
Thus









B.3 Estimation of Relative Quality Index




be the modified relative quality index to be estimated

















where Ut and W are defined in the main text. Let the objective function be
















2 + σ21 (C2tx− 1)
2 − 2σ12 (C1tx− 1) (C2tx− 1)
Det (Ω)
.


















1C2t − σ12 (C1t + C2t)
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(ii) The two-step procedure













The estimated errors are





















and use Ω̂ for the second step estimation.
(iii) Conditional expectation and variance of estimated quality index
Let qt be a true quality index (up to some unknown scale) and (ũ1t, ũ2t)
be defined in (3.27), the estimated quality index based on (B.8) can be rewrit-
ten as









2 (ũ1t + 1) + σ
2
1 (ũ2t + 1)− σ12 (ũ1t + ũ2t + 2) ,
ΦLt = σ
2
2 (ũ1t + 1)
2 + σ21 (ũ2t + 1)
2 − 2σ12 (ũ1t + 1) (ũ2t + 1) .
The estimated index has the following conditional expectation






Let µ̃1 = E (ũ1t) and µ̃2 = E (ũ2t). By the Delta method with reference to the
means, conditional variance of the estimated quality index is
var (Φ|qt) = ∆Φ (µ̃1, µ̃2; qt)′ Ω∆Φ (µ̃1, µ̃2; qt) (B.14)
where
∆Φ (µ̃1, µ̃2; qt) =
 ∂Φ (ũ1t, ũ2t; qt) /∂ũ1t





















































where (ũ1t, ũ2t) are derived from the multiplicative residuals in the second-
step estimation. If the estimated correction factor is significantly different
from unit, the point and variance estimates of the estimated relative quality
index should be adjusted accordingly.
B.4 US Services-Goods Data Set
The annual data set on US services and goods covers the period 1946-
2006. The series are mainly retrieved from NIPA tables which are reported
by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. The series on population is from the
estimates of the US Census Bureau. Classifications of goods and services follow
the definitions of NIPA tables. The broad components of goods industries are
agriculture, forestry, and fisheries; mining; and manufacturing. The services
industries are transportation and public utilities; wholesale trade; retail trade
and automobile services; finance, insurance, and real estate; different services;
and government services.
The original data set has the following variables: (1) US population
index (US Census); (2) goods quantity index (NIPA 1.2.3); (3) goods price
index (NIPA 1.2.4); (4) services quantity index (NIPA 1.2.3); (5) services
price index (NIPA 1.2.4); and (6) budget share for goods (NIPA 1.5.5). It is
noted that we leave residential and non-residential structures out of the data
set. Some data features are worth noted as follows.
First, goods are both durable and nondurable. we rely on quantity
flows of new durable goods rather than service flows from durable stocks. The
reason for not using services flows is that stocks of durable goods are composed
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of different quality levels which are unknown. The same reason applies to the
omission of residential and non-residential structures, which can render services
for a very long period of time.
Second, the bottom line of the current NIPA tables is that: “...Percent
changes in real GDP and its components are equal to the percent changes of the
quantity indexes; percent changes in prices are equal to the percent changes of
the price indexes...” (A Guide to the NIPA’s by the BEA, 2001). Technically,
chain-type quantity and price indices are based on Fisher (F ) formula which
uses weights from two adjacent years, i.e. a combination of Laspeyres (L)
and Paasche (P ) indices. Specifically, let q’s and p’s be quantities and prices,
Fisher quantity index of period t relative to that of period t− 1 is
QFt =
√











and by the same token, Fisher price index of period t is
P Ft =
√


















The intuition behind (B.16) and (B.17) is that if quantities or prices
do not change, QFt = 1 or P
F
t = 1, respectively. To put it differently, (B.16)
reflects only changes in aggregate quantity, and (B.17) is only for variations in
aggregate price. The product QFt ×P Ft is the growth rate of the nominal value
between time t and time t− 1 (B.18). Based on this observation, in practice,
most GDP components’ nominal values and price indices are derived first from
different Federal Government surveys. Then, starting with the most detailed
level for which all the necessary data are available, nominal values are deflated
to have real values or quantities (NIPA Help, BEA website).
Third, the construction of year-to-year quantity and price indices are
based on the set of commodities existing in two adjacent years. If the set of
varieties not shared between two adjacent years is relatively small, which is
highly likely the case, time series of aggregate quantity and aggregate price
are reliable for the quality inference procedure.
Besides the variables which will be used in the separation exercise, we
look at the composition of GDP from the expenditure perspective to see how
much the United States depends on the Rest of the World. Table B.1 shows
that we can treat the US as relatively closed.
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Table B.1: Relative completion of the US economy 1946-2006, percent
Accounts 1946 2006 1946-2006
Gross domestic product 100.0 100.0 100.0
Personal consumption expenditures 64.9 70.0 64.5
Goods 44.3 28.6 33.8
Services 20.6 41.4 30.7
Gross private domestic investment 14.0 16.7 16.0
Goods 7.2 7.8 7.6
Structures 6.8 8.9 8.4
Net exports of goods and services 3.2 −5.7 −0.7
Exports 6.4 11.1 7.5
Goods 5.3 7.8 5.6
Services 1.1 3.3 1.9
Imports 3.2 16.8 8.2
Goods 2.3 14.2 6.6
Services 0.9 2.6 1.6
Government expenditures & investment 17.8 19.0 20.2
Source: Table 1.5.5, NIPA, US Bureau of Economic Analysis.
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Appendix C
Derivations for Chapter 4
C.1 Social Planner Problem: Necessary Conditions
We are solving the dynamic programming problem laid out in Definition
4.2.1. There are some notes about the choice variables in Table C.1. It is noted
that the effective number of decisions is eight.
Table C.1: Notes about choice variables
description range notes
labor for Yat 0 < lat < 1 lat > 0 for µ ∈ (0, 1)
labor for Ybt 0 < lbt < 1 lbt > 0 for γ ∈ (0, 1)
labor for αt 0 < nat < 1 nat > 0 for ξ ∈ (0, 1)
labor for βt 0 < nbt < 1 nbt > 0 for ξ ∈ (0, 1)
capital for Yat 0 < kat < kt kat > 0 for µ ∈ (0, 1)
capital for Ybt 0 < kbt < kt kbt > 0 for γ ∈ (0, 1)
consumption of a 0 < at < Yat replaced, at = Yat − xat
consumption of b 0 < bt < Ybt replaced, bt = Ybt − xbt
investment from a 0 < xat < Yat xat > 0 for ν ∈ (0, 1)
investment from b 0 < xbt < Ybt xbt > 0 for ν ∈ (0, 1)
Recall that ωt = {αt−1, βt−1, kt, At, Bt}. Let {µ1t, µ2t} be the La-
grangian multipliers for the capital and labor constraints in period t. The
Bellman equation in (4.25) can be rewritten as
V (ωt) = max
C1t,C2t
L (ωt) , (C.1)
L (ωt) = u (Yat − xat, Ybt − xbt;αt, βt) + λEtV (ωt+1)
+ µ1t (1− lat − lbt − nat − nbt)
+ µ2t (kt − kat − kbt) .
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To simplify the upcoming expressions, let
ct =
[
αθt (Yat − xat)






αθt (Yat − xat)











































































































lat + lbt + nat + nbt = 1; µ1t > 0 (C.13)
µ2t :
kat + kbt = kt; µ2t > 0. (C.14)
C.2 Social Planner Problem: the Steady State
We are now solving for the nonstochastic steady state which satisfies
state: At = A,Bt = B,αt = α, βt = β, kt = k;
labor: lat = la, lbt = lb, nat = na, nbt = nb;
capital: kat = ka, kbt = kb;
output: Yat = Ya, Ybt = Yb;
uses: at = a, bt = b, xat = xa, xbt = xb;
multipliers: µ1t = µ1, µ2t = µ2.
1) There are 13 conditions for 13 unknowns (la, lb), (na, nb),(k, ka, kb),
(α, β), (xa, xb), (µ1, µ2)
c−σdαθaθ−1 (1− µ) (Ya/la) = µ1 (C.15)
c−σdβθbθ−1 (1− γ) (Yb/lb) = µ1 (C.16)
c−σdαθaθ−1µ (Ya/ka) = µ2 (C.17)
c−σdβθbθ−1γ (Yb/kb) = µ2 (C.18)
c−σdaθαθ−1 [1 + λ (1− ηα)] ξ (na)ξ−1 = µ1 (C.19)
c−σdbθβθ−1 [1 + λ (1− ηβ)] ξ (nb)ξ−1 = µ1 (C.20)





















b = δk (C.25)







ka + kb = k. (C.27)
2) Substitute na into (C.19) and nb into (C.20). In addition, the mul-
tipliers µ1 and µ2 can be eliminated. The system is collapsed into a new one
with 9 equations in 9 unknowns (la, lb), (k, ka, kb), (α, β), (xa, xb)
α1/ξ (1− µ) (Ya/la) = a [1 + λ (1− ηα)] ξη(1−1/ξ)α (C.28)
β1/ξ (1− γ) (Yb/lb) = b [1 + λ (1− ηβ)] ξη(1−1/ξ)β (C.29)
αθaθ−1 (1− µ) (Ya/la) = βθbθ−1 (1− γ) (Yb/lb) (C.30)
αθaθ−1µ (Ya/ka) = β
θbθ−1γ (Yb/kb) (C.31)
















b = δk (C.34)







ka + kb = k. (C.36)
3) We transform some variables to simplify the system. Let
S = kb/k (C.37)
Q = kb/lb (C.38)
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Xa = xa/Ya (C.39)
Xb = xb/Yb. (C.40)


































































γ (1− µ) + (µ− γ)S
la =
γ (1− µ) (1− S)





















From (C.28) and (C.29)
a =
α1/ξ (1− µ) (Ya/la)
[1 + λ (1− ηα)] ξη(1−1/ξ)α
, (C.49)
b =
β1/ξ (1− γ) (Yb/lb)
[1 + λ (1− ηβ)] ξη(1−1/ξ)β
. (C.50)













(1− µ) [1 + λ (1− ηβ)] η(1−1/ξ)β


















(1− µ) [1 + λ (1− ηβ)] η(1−1/ξ)β















[1 + λ (1− ηβ)] η(1−1/ξ)β


































Equation (C.33) can be rewritten as
1 =


























4) We now solve for Q. Equation (C.34) can be rewritten as
φ (XaYa)
ν (XbYb)



































Λ = ν (µ− 1) + (1− ν) (γ − 1) 6= 0.





















, θ (1 + ξ) 6= 1. (C.59)
6) We will find (S,Xa, Xb). Equations (C.28) and (C.29) are rewritten
as
α1/ξ (1− µ)
[1 + λ (1− ηα)] ξη(1−1/ξ)α
= (1−Xa) la, (C.60)
β1/ξ (1− γ)
[1 + λ (1− ηβ)] ξη(1−1/ξ)β
= (1−Xb) lb. (C.61)
Based on (C.47)-(C.48) and (C.53)-(C.54), we divide (C.61) by (C.60)
[1 + λ (1− ηα)] η(1−1/ξ)α (1− γ)













] µ (1− γ)S
γ (1− µ) (1− S)
γ [1 + λ (1− ηα)] η(1−1/ξ)α
µ [1 + λ (1− ηβ)] η(1−1/ξ)β
(C3)
1/ξ =
[S − (1− ν) δλγ]




γ [1 + λ (1− ηα)] η(1−1/ξ)α
µ [1 + λ (1− ηβ)] η(1−1/ξ)β
(C3)
1/ξ , (C.62)
and the expression for S follows
S − (1− ν) δλγ
1− S − νδλµ
= C4
S =
C4 (1− νδλµ) + (1− ν) δλγ
1 + C4
. (C.63)
Plug S into (C.53) to find Xa and into (C.54) to find Xb.
7) At this point, all of the transformed variables are known, i.e. S, Q,
Xa, Xb can be defined as explicit functions of the parameters. Other variables













[1 + λ (1− ηα)] ξη(1−1/ξ)α (1−Xa) γ (1− S)
γ (1− µ) + (µ− γ)S
; (C.64)
and
α1/ξ = C5 − C5 (ηα)1/ξ α1/ξ − C5 (ηβC3)1/ξ α1/ξ[
1 + C5 (ηα)








1 + C5 (ηα)







1 + C5 (ηα)




Based on α and β, we can back out na from (C.23), nb from (C.24),
la from (C.47), and lb from (C.48). Next, we can compute Ya from (C.43), Yb
from (C.45), a from (C.49), and b from (C.50). Equations (C.39) and (C.40)
generate xa and xb. Based on (C.55), we know k. Next are ka and kb from
(C.37), µ1 from (C.15) and µ2 from (C.17).
8) The wage and interest rate are derived here. Normalized pa = 1.
The equilibrium wage is based on (C.43) and interest rate on (C.44)
w = (1− µ) paYa
la















9) There are several objects of special interest: b/a, Yb/Ya, β/α, pba, Sb.




(1− γ) [1 + λ (1− ηα)] η(1−1/ξ)α












γµ (1− γ)1−µ [1 + λ (1− ηα)] η(1−1/ξ)α





1/ξ Cγ−µ2 . (C.69)




















[C4 (1− νδλµ) + (1− ν) δλγ]
[1 + C4νδλµ− (1− ν) δλγ]
. (C.70)
From (C.58) and (C.69), the steady-state equilibrium relative price is
pba =
∂u (a, b;α, β) /∂b















γµ (1− γ)1−µ [1 + λ (1− ηα)] η(1−1/ξ)α
























γµ (1− γ)1−µ [1 + λ (1− ηα)] η(1−1/ξ)α












These five objects are functions of C1, C2, and C3, where (conditional
on A)
C1 = const× (B/A)θ
C2 = const× (B/A)−(1−ν)/Λ
C3 = const× (B/A)(1−µ)θ/{[θ−(1−θ)/ξ]Λ} .
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After some manipulations, we observe the following qualitative effects
sign [∂ (b/a) /∂ (B/A)] = sign [(1− θξ) (θξ + θ − 1) Λ] (C.75)
sign [∂ (β/α) /∂ (B/A)] = sign [θ (θξ + θ − 1) Λ] (C.76)
sign [∂pba/∂ (B/A)] = sign [Λ] (C.77)
sign [∂Sb/∂ (B/A)] = sign [θ (θξ + θ − 1) Λ] . (C.78)
C.3 Log-linearization and Laws of Motion
To approximate the laws of motion of the endogenous objects, we first
log-linearize the system of FOCs (C.5)-(C.14). A transformed variable is inter-
preted as percentage deviation of the original variable from the corresponding
nonstochastic steady state value. In notation, x̂t = log xt − log x, where xt is
the original variable, x̂t is the transformed version, and x is the steady state
value. For small deviations, x̂t ≈ (xt − x)/x, and f(xt) = f(x) + f ′(x)xx̂t.
Evolution of the endogenous state variables {αt−1, βt−1, kt} are specified in
(4.6)-(4.8). The law of motion for the exogenous state variables {At, Bt} is






























We can substitute out the multipliers µ1t and µ2t. After some simple















































































) } = 0, (C.86)
and (4.4)-(4.10). In every period t, given the state {αt−1, βt−1, kt, At, Bt}, the
set of endogenous variables can be collapsed into a minimal set, based on
which all the remaining equilibrium objects can be backed out. We choose
the minimal set {αt, βt, kt+1, lbt, kbt, xbt}. Recall that there are more choice
variables. From (4.4)-(4.8), the remaining decisions can be defined as follows:
nat = [αt− (1−ηα)αt−1]1/ξ; nbt = [βt− (1−ηβ)βt−1]1/ξ; lat = 1− lbt−nat−nbt;
kat = kt−kbt; and xat = [(kt+1−(1−δ)kt)/(φx1−νbt )]1/ν . Based on (C.81)-(C.86),
we construct a log-linearized system of expectation difference equations
Et {ζ0zt+1 + ζ1zt + ζ2zt−1 + κ0st+1 + κ1st} (C.87)
where zt = [α̂t β̂t k̂t+1 l̂bt k̂bt x̂bt]
′; st = [Ât β̂t]
′; {ζ0, ζ1, ζ2} are 6×6 matrices; and
{κ0, κ1} are 6×2 matrices. In fact, these matrices are the first-order derivatives
of the system (C.81)-(C.86) with respect to the corresponding variables in
(C.87), and then rescaled by steady state values. Though we can derive these
matrices analytically, it is much easier to compute them.
Let Γ(6×6) and Ψ(6×2) respectively be the feedback and feedforward
matrices. The linear laws of motion of the endogenous objects have the form
zt = Γzt−1 + Ψst (C.88)
st = ρst−1 + εt, (C.89)
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where matrix ρ is derived from log-linearization of (C.79); Γ and Ψ are un-
known and solved by the method of undetermined coefficients (Christiano
2002). More specifically, Γ and Ψ are respectively solutions of the matrix
equations
ζ0Γ
2 + ζ1Γ + ζ2 = 0 (C.90)
ζ0ΓΨ + ζ0Ψρ+ ζ1Ψ + κ0ρ+ κ1. (C.91)
In Section 4.3, given the specified parameters, these two matrices, which
correspond to different values of θ, given ξ = 2/3, are
Γθ=−3 =

0.75 0.06 0.02 0 0 0
0.06 0.71 0.03 0 0 0
0.10 0.12 0.57 0 0 0
0.39 −0.08 −0.08 0 0 0
0.27 −0.26 1.00 0 0 0
1.95 2.40 −7.54 0 0 0











0.81 −0.00 0.03 0 0 0
−0.01 0.78 0.03 0 0 0
0.11 0.11 0.57 0 0 0
−0.02 0.31 −0.10 0 0 0
−0.17 0.18 0.98 0 0 0
2.15 2.23 −7.53 0 0 0











0.97 −0.16 0.04 0 0 0
−0.02 0.79 0.03 0 0 0
0.03 0.20 0.57 0 0 0
−0.08 0.34 −0.03 0 0 0
−0.13 0.09 1.05 0 0 0
0.54 4.04 −7.71 0 0 0










With the quality-augmented capital hypothesis, the set of state vari-
ables has one more element {αt−1, βt−1, qt, kt, At, Bt} where qt evolves accord-
ing to (4.22); and the production functions become (4.23) and (4.24) where
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average quality augments capital services. The dynamic programming prob-
lem is again defined as in (C.1). We use the shorthands {ct, dt} in (C.2) and



























































These expressions are related to the future marginal gains of current
quality investment via capital augmentation. With these notations, the full











































































lat + lbt + nat + nbt = 1; µ1t > 0 (C.102)
135
kat + kbt = kt; µ2t > 0. (C.103)
The steady state of interest is {la, lb, na, nb, k, ka, kb, α, β, q, xa, xb}. To
solve for these objects, we rely on (C.22)-(C.24) and the following 9 conditions
α1/ξ (1− µ)Ya/la = {a [1 + λ (1− ηα)] + YaλµSkν} ξη(1−1/ξ)α (C.104)
β1/ξ (1− γ)Yb/lb = {b [1 + λ (1− ηβ)] + YbλγSk (1− ν)} ξη(1−1/ξ)β (C.105)
αθaθ−1 (1− µ) (Ya/la) = βθbθ−1 (1− γ) (Yb/lb) (C.106)
αθaθ−1µ (Ya/ka) = β
θbθ−1γ (Yb/kb) (C.107)
















b = δ (ka + kb) (C.110)







q = ανβ1−ν . (C.112)
To approximate dynamic behavior around the steady state, we apply
log-linearization and the method of undetermined coefficient once again. Let
zt = [α̂t β̂t q̂t k̂t+1 l̂bt k̂bt x̂bt]
′ and st = [Ât β̂t]








ξ−1 + λc−σt+1dt+1DAt+1 (nat)










ξ−1 + λc−σt+1dt+1DBt+1 (nbt)
















































) } = 0 (C.118)
Et
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C.5 Technical Details of the US Application
Our main interest is the time path of US services-goods relative quality
{Q}2006t=1970 which is driven by technology changes. To infer this unobservable
time series, we need to find {θ, ηα, ηβ, ξ}, {At, Bt}2006t=1970, and the initial state
which make the model time paths {Yat, Ybt, pt, Sbt}2006t=1970 have some moments
close to those of data. The representative agent is assumed to perfectly observe
and foresee the evolutions of At and Bt, i.e. there are no uncertainties.
Let the model time length be T + 1, which includes period 0 and the
terminal period T . In T , there are no intertemporal benefits and hence no
dynamic decisions. Thus we have the time line [0, 1, .., S, S + 1, .., T ], where 1
and S respectively correspond the years 1970 and 2006, i.e. S = 36. Relabeling
the time line, we need to find {At, Bt}Tt=1. By normalization, in the year 2000,
AS−5 = 1 and BS−5 = 0.98. The entire productivity time series are constructed
based on the geometric mean growth rates of {At, Bt} in the sample period
1970-2006. Next, {α0, β0, k0} are assumed to be at the steady state values if
the economy has productivity levels {A1, B1} forever.
Given {At, Bt}Tt=1 and {α0, β0, k0}, we need to find the four critical
parameters. Our algorithm has two levels, the higher for finding these un-
known parameters and the lower for having the corresponding equilibrium.
At the higher level, we start with some guess on {θ, ηα, ηβ, ξ}; construct the
differences between data and model moments; update the guess for the next
round, and continue until the guess converges. At the lower level, given some
{θ, ηα, ηβ, ξ}, we need to solve a large system of equations, which characterizes
the corresponding equilibrium for [1, .., T ]. The end point T is chosen not very
far from S so that productivity projections are reliable; and at the same time,
far enough so that the solutions in [1, .., S] are not significantly influenced by
terminal decisions. In fact, there is a trade-off between these two objectives.
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Here are some details about the lower level. First, {θ, ηα, ηβ, ξ}, {α0,
β0, k0}, {At, Bt}Tt=1 are given numbers. Second, all the dynamic choices in
period T are zero. Third, the state observed at the beginning of any period t
consists of {αt−1, βt−1, kt, At, Bt}, out of which the first three are endogenous.
Fourth, as ν ∈ (0, 1), xat > 0 and xbt > 0; and for ξ ∈ (0, 1), nat > 0 and
nbt > 0. We choose the minimal set of equilibrium objects in each period to be
{lbt, kbt, nat, nbt, xat, xbt}, out of which the last four govern the evolution of the
state. Fifth, we have a system of 6T nonlinear equations derived from (C.5)



































































































−c−σt dtβθt bθ−1t = 0.
(C.125)
For the terminal period T , there are some changes as follows: two





















bt = 0; (C.127)
and (C.124)-(C.125) are changed to
xat = 0 (C.128)
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xbt = 0. (C.129)
Thus the system effectively has 6T − 2 nonlinear equations in 6T − 2
unknowns.
At the upper level, the objective function for moment matching is
F (τ) = (m (τ)−m)′ (m (τ)−m) , (C.130)
where τ = {θ, ηα, ηβ, ξ}; and {m,m(τ)} are vectors of data and model mo-
ments, respectively. Based on the limited data set, we only have two data
moments: one is the angle between the linear trends of Bt/At and Sbt, and one
is the slope of Sbt trend. It is noted that, as predicted by Proposition 4.3.3,
the relative price does not bear information of these parameters, i.e. simulated
pbat does not respond to changes in τ . In this model, we are more interested in
{θ, ξ} than {ηα, ηβ}. To overcome the under-identification problem, we need to
fix {ηα, ηβ}. We first impose that ηα = ηβ and do experiments on the discrete
parameter space. Based on the objective function, we see that {ηα, ηβ} should
be small and cannot be zero. Next, by perturbing {ηα, ηβ}, we find ηβ > ηα
should hold. Finally, ηα = 0.0045 and ηβ = 0.0055. Conditional on {ηα, ηβ},
we employ Newton’s method to search for {θ, ξ}.
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